

Sociology 7491

Seminar: Legitimacy and Breakdown of Liberal Democracy

Course Description:

Concerns the structural requisites of liberal democracy. We will consider a framework for analysis, and then read background literature for it: general theories of democracy and Western political development, followed by an examination of topics including - problems of industrialization and state-building; socioeconomic development and the sequencing of crises; the development of citizenship rights; breakdowns, transitions, and consolidations of democracy; the types of party systems and extremism; forms of government coalition and conflict resolution; and the questions of political culture and regime legitimation. Illustrative and empirical material will be drawn mainly from European and American cases.

Course Requirements:

Class participation and reports. One 15-20 page paper, due on the last day of class.

Course Outline

- A. Theories of Social Structure and Liberal Democracy
 - 1. Frameworks for Analysis of Liberal Democracy
 - 2. Some General Theories of Liberal Democracy

- B. The Development and Structure of Liberal Democracy
 - 1. State-Building, Industrialization, and Citizenship
 - 2. Breakdown and Regeneration of Liberal Democracy
 - a. Breakdowns
 - b. Transitions and Consolidation
 - c. Eastern Europe
 - 3. Opposition Structure
 - a. Party Systems: Oppositional, Non-oppositional, Polarized, Extremism
 - b. Government Coalitions
 - c. Neo-Corporatist Conflict Resolution
 - 4. Political Culture
 - 5. Legitimation Problems: Overloads and Grid-locks

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Reading List

WEEK 1: Frameworks for Analysis of Liberal Democracy

Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy, ch. 3, 4, 11, 15.

Frederick Weil, "Political Culture, Political Structure and Democracy: The Case of Legitimation and Opposition Structure." Research on Democracy and Society, Vol. 2, Political Culture and Political Structure: Theoretical and Empirical Studies.

WEEK 2: Some General Theories of Liberal Democracy

Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Part IV, "Socialism and Democracy."

Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, ch. 1-2.

Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, chs. 1, 3-5, 7-11; skim ch. 6.

Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, chs. 8, 15, 17-19; skim chs. 9, 14, 16, 20, 21.

WEEK 3: State-Building, Industrialization, and Citizenship, part I

Herbert Kitschelt. 1992. "Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?" American Political Science Review 86:1028-1034.

T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," ch. 4 of Class, Citizenship and Social Development.

Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, ch. 7-8.

Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, ch. 1-4, 7.

Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, ch. 1-3, 10.

Gregory Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe, ch. 1, 9.

Therborn, Göran. 1977. "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy." New Left Review 103:3-41.

Suggested:

Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, ch. 2.

Samuel Huntington, Democracy: The Third Wave, selections.

Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, ch. 2-3, 8.

Morris Janowitz, "Observations on the sociology of citizenship: obligations and rights." Social Forces 59, 1 (1980): 1-24.

Luebbert, Gregory M. 1987. "Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe." World Politics 39:449-78.

Stephens, John D. 1989. "Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis." American Journal of Sociology 94:1019-1077.

WEEK 4: State-Building, Industrialization, and Citizenship, part II

Raymond Grew, ed., Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States, ch. 1, 2, 5, 9; skim one from ch. 6-8.

Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter Evans et al., eds., Bringing the State Back In.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, and John Charles Torres. 1993. "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy." International Social Science Review, Spring.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1994. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." American Sociological Review 59:1-22.

Diamond, Larry. 1992. "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered." American Behavioral Scientist 35(4/5):442-49.

Suggested:

Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe, ch. 1, 8, 9.

Charles Tilly. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990.

Alford and Friedland, pp. 185-92, 254-59 (a summary of Tilly's theories).

Michael Mann. States, War and Capitalism (1988), and The Sources of Social Power (1986).

Leonard Binder, et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development, skim.

Philip Coulter, Social Mobilization and Liberal Democracy, ch. 1-4.

WEEK 5: Breakdown and Regeneration I: Breakdowns of Democracy

Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration.

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, "Europe" ch. 1, 2, 5.

Zimmermann, Ekkart and Thomas Saalfeld. 1988. "Economic and Political Reactions to the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s in Six European Countries." International Studies Quarterly 32:305-334.

G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence, ch. 1-3, 5, 6, 9, 10 (esp. chapter summaries).

WEEK 6: Breakdown and Regeneration II: Transitions and Consolidation

Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies" (all), "Comparative Perspectives" ch. 1-3 "Southern Europe" ch. 4.

Karl, Terry Lynn. and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1991. "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe." International Social Science Journal 128:269-84.

Linz, Juan J and Alfred Stepan. 1989. "Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation or Destruction: European and South American Comparisons." Pp. 41-61 in Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum, edited by Robert A. Pastor.

Share, Donald. 1987. "Transitions to Democracy and Transition Through Transaction." Comparative Political Studies 19, 4:525-548.

Mainwaring, Scott. 1992. "Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues." Pp. 294-342 in Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, edited by Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela. University of Notre Dame Press.

Suggested:

Gregory M. Luebbert, Comparative Democracy: Policy Making and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel.

WEEK 7: Breakdown and Regeneration III: Transitions and Consolidation, cont.

Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, ch. 1, 2, 4.

Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies, selections.

Burton, Michael G. and John Higley. 1987. "Elite Settlements." American Sociological Review 52, 3:295-307.

Higley, John and Richard Gunther. 1992. Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, ch. 1, 12.

Suggested:

Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1989. Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

WEEK 8: Breakdown and Regeneration IV: Eastern Europe

Nancy Bermeo, "Surprise, Surprise: Lessons from 1989 and 1991," in Bermeo, ed., Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; "Rethinking Regime Change," Comparative Politics 22(3):359-77 (1990); "Democracy in Europe," Daedalus 123(2):159-78 (1994).

Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution, selections.

Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1993. "Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe." British Journal of Political Science 23:521-48.

Janos, Andrew C. 1994. "Continuity and Change in Eastern Europe: Strategies of Post-Communist Politics." East European Politics and Societies 8(1):1-31.

Frederick D. Weil, ed., Democratization in Eastern and Western Europe. Volume 1 of Research on Democracy and Society, chapters by Huffman and Gautier, Di Palma, Weil.

Frederick D. Weil. 1994. "Democratic Legitimation in Tough Times: Germany Since Reunification." Meetings of the International Political Science Association. Berlin, August 20--25.

Max Kaase, "Political Culture and Political Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe," in Frederick Weil, ed., Political Culture and Political Structure: Theoretical and Empirical Studies. Volume 2 of Research on Democracy and Society.

WEEK 9: Opposition Structure I: Oppositional and Non-oppositional Party Systems

Seymour Martin Lipset, Conflict and Consensus, ch. 4 (skim sections on Parsons' theories), 6.

Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, ch. 1-4.

Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, ch. 1-3, 6-9, 13.

Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., Western European Party Systems, ch. 2, 3.

Franklin, Mary N., Thomas T. Mackie, and Henry Valen. 1992. Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structure in Western Countries, ch. 1, 20.

Suggested:

Kenneth McRae, ed., Consociational Democracy, chapters by Val Lorwin and Arend Lijphart.

Eric Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies.

Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, ch. 3, 4, 7; skim ch. 8.

WEEK 10: Opposition Structure II: Polarized Party Systems and Extremism

Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, ch. 6.

Sani, Giacomo and Giovanni Sartori. 1983. "Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies," ch. 11 in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., Western European Party Systems.

Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason, ch. 12; skim ch. 11.

Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 1-41, 59-109, 141-189.

Gino Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism, ch. 1-4 (skim).

Suggested:

Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development, ch. 1, Conclusion; skim ch. 2, 3, 6.

Richard Rose, ed., Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis.

Giuseppe di Palma, Surviving Without Governing: The Italian Parties in Parliament, esp. ch. 6.

Frederick Weil, Post-Fascist Liberalism: The Development of Political Tolerance in West Germany since World War II, ch. 1, 7. (If you are interested, also: "Structural Determinants of Political Tolerance: Regime Change and the Party System in West Germany since World War II." Research in Political Sociology, Vol. 5 [1991].)

WEEK 11: Opposition Structure III: Government Coalitions

Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. 1990. Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press.

WEEK 12: Opposition Structure IV: Neo-Corporatist Conflict Resolution

Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, ch. 1-3, 5, 6, 8, 10.

Philippe Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Western Europe and North America," pp. 287-330 in Suzanne Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe.

Peter Gerlich, Edgar Grande, and Wolfgang C. Müller. 1988. "Corporatism in Crisis: Stability and Change of Social Partnership in Austria." Political Studies 36:209-223.

Suggested:

Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, ch. 9; skim ch. 7.

WEEK 13: Political Culture and Participation

Steven Brint, "Sociological Analysis of Political Culture," pp. 3-44 in Frederick Weil, ed., Research on Democracy and Society, Vol. 2, Political Culture and Political Structure: Theoretical and Empirical Studies.

Sidney Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," ch. 12 in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, ch. 14 (skim character sketches); The Civic Culture Revisited, skim ch. 1; read one from ch. 5-8.

Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America, "Part" summaries, pp. 116-21, 263-64, 332-33, ch. 20.

Sidney Verba, et al., Participation and Political Equality, ch. 1, 14.

Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase, et al., Political Action, ch. 4-6, 12.

M. Kent Jennings and Jan W. van Deth, et al. 1990. Continuities in Political Action, ch. 1-3, 11.

Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, ch. 2-4.

Suggested:

Frederick Weil, "The Variable Effects of Education on Liberal Attitudes: A Comparative-Historical Analysis of Anti-Semitism using Public Opinion Survey Data." American Sociological Review 50, 4:458-474 (1985). And "Cohorts, Regimes, and the Legitimation of Democracy: West Germany since 1945." American Sociological Review 52, 3:308-24.

Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development, ch. 1, 3, 4, 8.

Alan Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness.

Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy.

Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," American Political Science Review 82:1203-1231 (1988), and Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies (1990), selections.

Lawrence Bobo and Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. 1990. "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment." American Political Science Review 84:377-394.

WEEK 14: Legitimation Problems: Overloads and Impasses

Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp. 1-50.

Michel Crozier, et al., The Crisis of Democracy, ch. 1-3, 5.

Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind, ch. 1, 4, 12; and "The Confidence Gap During the Reagan Years, 1981-87," in the Political Science Quarterly.

Frederick D. Weil. 1989. "The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies: A Consolidated Model Tested with Time-Series Data in Six Countries since World War II." American Sociological Review 54, 5:682-706.

Juan J. Linz. 1988. "Legitimacy of Democracy and the Socioeconomic System in Western Democracies." Pp. 65-113 in Mattei Dogan, ed., Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy. Westview. Boulder.

Suggested:

Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, ch. 6.

Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, Second Edition, ch. 2-3, and pp. 469-76.

Morris Janowitz, The Last Half-Century, ch. 4-5.

Robert E. Lane, "The Legitimacy Bias: Conservative Man in Market and State," ch. 4 in Bogdan Denitch, ed., Legitimation of Regimes.

Ralf Dahrendorf, "Effectiveness and Legitimacy: on the 'Governability' of Democracies," Political Quarterly 51, 4 (October-December 1980): 393-410.

Richard Rose, "Dynamic Tendencies in the Legitimacy of Regimes," World Politics 21, 4 (July 1969).

Suggested Readings on Nineteenth Century theories of Liberal Democracy

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Garden City, New York, Anchor, 1969).

Volume 1: Part I, chs. 2-3;

Part I, ch. 5 skim pp. 61-86; read pp. 87-98;

Part II, ch. 4, skim;

Part II, ch. 6, skim pp. 231-241; read pp. 241-245;

Part II, chs. 7-8, skim;

Part II, chs. 9.

Volume 2: Part II, chs. 1-8, 20;

Part IV, entire.

John Stuart Mill, "Tocqueville on Democracy in America (Volume II)," ch. vi in Essays on Politics and Culture, edited by Gertrude Himmelfarb; "On Liberty," ch. 1 in Three Essays (Oxford U. Press); "Considerations of Representative Government," chs. 3, 6, 8 in Three Essays.

Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," part I, pp. 26-46 in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, Second Edition; "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," pp. 53-65 in Tucker.

And for background: Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, Introduction, Part II; Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism.

Sociology 7491 - Suggested Paper Topics

You may write on one of the topics listed below or you may propose another topic subject to my approval. Papers are due on the last day of class. Lateness must be arranged ahead of time.

1. Comment on one of the following two statements.
 - a. Historical evidence demonstrates that the success of liberal democracy is inversely proportionate to the degree and intensity of social conflict in a given state, directly proportionate to certain structural and institutional forms of social conflict, but unrelated to the substantive content of social conflict once the first two aspects of conflict have been taken into account.
 - b. The legitimacy of liberal democracy differs in the United States from that in Western Europe.
2. Critically evaluate Weil, "Political Culture, Political Structure and Democracy: The Case of Legitimation and Opposition Structure." You may restrict yourself to the course readings as a basis for this critique.
3. Analyze the pivotal role of the party system with respect to liberal democracy. On one side, consider the relation of the party system to the historical lines of development: the "crystallization" of cleavage lines into a party system and the current fit between cleavage lines and parties. And on the other side, consider the relationship of the party system to political culture and the structural consequences of different party systems (e.g., "polarized plural," "consociational democratic").

Themes for Next Meeting
Frameworks for Analysis of Liberal Democracy: Week 1

My paper, "Political Culture, Political Structure and Democracy: The Case of Legitimation and Opposition Structure," will help provide an introduction to the readings in this course. It attempts, among other things, to summarize and synthesize the disparate literatures brought together here.

- Don't worry too much if some of the discussions in the paper are quite compressed. We will be able to discuss them in class, and we will be spending the whole semester looking into their background.
- Also, don't worry if you don't agree with my point of view. This is a discussion class, and the purpose is to debate things. I simply want to provide a coherent framework for discussion: if you don't like the point of view, then think of it as a solid target to aim at.

In the Alford and Friedland book, concentrate on the sections on democracy - especially the central points of view of each theory and each theory's critiques of the other points of view.

- You can think of my "Political Culture" paper partially as an attempt to improve on what Alford and Friedland call the "Pluralist" perspective. However, I also attempt to include some of what they call the "Managerial" perspective.
- The "pluralist" and "managerial" perspectives could also be viewed as two sides of Weber's discussion of legitimate domination. Are Alford and Friedland justified in separating them?

Themes for Next Meeting
Some General Theories of Liberal Democracy: Week 2

What are the lines of argument among Schumpeter, Dahl, and Pateman regarding political participation in a liberal democracy?

- Is Schumpeter's critique of what he calls "classical" democratic theory valid? Consider its relation to theories of Weber, Michels, and Burke.
- How effective is Pateman's critique of Schumpeter? How relevant is it?
- Dahl seems implicitly to suggest, in a variety of ways, that the debate about the extent of participation is beside the point; but he also calls for participation in local self government. Where does this stance put him in relation to nineteenth century theories? Has he resolved the debate?

How well do Schumpeter and Dahl, in particular, distinguish between liberal and democratic elements of a regime form or political culture?

- Are their formulations an improvement on nineteenth century theories? A clarification?
- Note that Schumpeter tends to draw a logical distinction and that Dahl emphasizes developmental and structural (as against substantive) distinctions. Which theoretical strategy is more effective?

What arguments do Schumpeter, Dahl, and Pateman present regarding the conditions for the success or development of liberal democracy?

- Consider Schumpeter's five conditions for success. Do you find them tautological? Ideological or self-serving with respect to his empirical theory? Or are they true causal conditions? Is he right?
- What do you think of Pateman's attempted revival of theories of the effects of education through participation: is she persuasive?
- Dahl presents a very comprehensive theory: you should note its elements carefully (and don't let his civics-text style lead you to think that he is simple-minded: his footnotes prove that he is responding in a sophisticated manner to the empirical and theoretical literature and, in many ways, advancing the latter). Pay close attention to the effects of the following: the sequence of development, the substance of cleavages as against the structure of cleavages, the beliefs and intentions of elites as against institutional structure and legitimacy, political trust, foreign intervention. What do you think?

Themes for Next Meeting
State-Building, Industrialization and Citizenship, part I: Week 3

This is a very disparate set of readings, each of which is also in many ways inconclusive. However, they are also quite rich and suggestive. If you have trouble integrating them, at least try to pursue individual themes.

Look for arguments regarding the effect of sequence of development on the possible emergence of liberal democracy.

- What new arguments do this week's writers present regarding the impact of mass political mobilization or enfranchisement on the creation or preservation of liberty? Do they contradict other theories we have seen?
- Of this week's writers, Bendix's account of the transition from traditional to modern sociopolitical forms is probably the most consistent with 19th century theories; but he seems partly to have recoiled from this position (ch. 8). What is the nature of his "reconsideration" and the implicit criticism of others of the 19th century theoretical heritage?
- T. H. Marshall's article has proved very influential in subsequent theory-building. Note his characterization of the unraveling and re-weaving of the three strands of citizenship since medieval times, and how he makes one stage of development depend on the previous one. How strong a causal argument does he make?
- What is the importance of sequence in Huntington (you might want to skim ch. 1) and Moore?

Look for arguments regarding the effect of structural balances in society and polity on the chances of liberal democracy.

- Moore makes a great deal of the balance of power between social classes and the effects of class alliances. Consider whether this account is unique to the classes Moore discusses and whether it is unique to class structure at all (as against other social structures). You might be interested to (re-) read Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations, Book III) or Max Weber (General Economic History, Part IV) to see how Moore was anticipated in this respect.
- What is the relation between centralization and conflict resolution in Huntington's theory? Do you find his account persuasive? (Again, you might want to skim ch. 1.) How does it contrast with Bendix's account of the relation between centralization and liberty? Note that both cite Tocqueville as an authority in this connection. What role does rate of change (esp. in political mobilization or enfranchisement) play in these accounts?

What effect does violent conflict have on the development of liberal democracy in these theories? What effect does it have on an established liberal democratic regime? What do you think these writers would say about its effect on the re-establishment of liberal democracy in post-fascist European countries?

Themes for Next Meeting
State-Building, Industrialization and Citizenship, part II: Week 4

The readings for this week are pivotal, since they attempt to provide a fairly comprehensive theory (with certain exceptions which you should consider), drawing together loose strands and answering many of the issues left unresolved by earlier writers we have read. They are also pivotal because they are the major source of general historical data which can be provided in this course. You should therefore read them very carefully for both theoretical and empirical content, and keep them in mind in future weeks to see how far they are able to answer more detailed problems.

Several of the writers for this week agree on a rough typology of sequences of development. Make certain that you understand the characterization of the different types.

- Grew, Thomas, and Gillis variously mention “Whiggish” accounts or models of English development and “belated nation” or “faulted nation” models of German development. In fact, these terms and concepts are rather old; but while these writers attempt to maintain a critical distance from them, they still find valuable kernels around which to build their own theories. Pay particular attention to Britain and Germany as approximations of these two ideal types.
- What is it about the particular sequencing of crises in Britain, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and the U.S. that made the development of liberal democracy more auspicious there than in Germany, Russia, and Poland? In what sense are Spain and Portugal, France, and Italy intermediate or mixed cases?
- How well do these typologies of sequencing correspond to older theoretical traditions we have read?

Consider whether a model of sequences is compatible with a social-structural model of development, or whether they are contradictory.

- What seems to be the attitude of the authors? Do they seem self-consciously to be offering an alternative to social-structural models of development like those of, say, Marx, Bendix, or Moore?
- How well do models of sequence account for or encompass the effects of such factors as new modes of production, class conflict, religious or ethnic conflict, nationalism, international competition?
- Look for indications of the effect of sequencing on the emergence of social movements and their institutionalization in political parties and other organizations. Consider how such crystallization or freezing of social cleavages affects subsequent chances for the development of liberal democracy.

What effect does sequencing have on the development of a liberal democratic structuration of conflict resolution?

Themes for Next Meeting
Breakdown and Regeneration: Weeks 5-7

The literature on anti-liberal democratic movements, the breakdown of liberal democracy, and the rise of fascism is one of the richest in social science. Here we sample a small part of it.

- Theories of “status anxiety” have been very important in explaining right-wing extremism. Note how Lipset and Germani use these theories, and how they relate them to macro-sociological explanations. To what extent can this perspective be incorporated into the framework we have developed in this course?
- Linz explicitly concentrates on proximate rather than distant causes of breakdown (see pp. 5, 54), but note how he treats such elements, which we have examined, as the components of legitimacy, Sartori’s polarized plural party systems, consociational expedients and the effect of a long history of accommodation - and the general question of content versus structuration of conflict, mutual trust (or its absence) among elites under crisis conditions, the extent of mass participation or mobilization, and the chances for a “Are-equilibration” of democracy from above - possibly in the absence of any other alternative.

Only recently has much been written about the regeneration of liberal democracy in Western countries after an eclipse. I will probably add some conference papers and manuscripts to the reading list, but in the meantime, the history of West Germany since 1945 can serve as a compressed picture of many of the elements we have examined up to this week. Although I have since refined the model of the structure and development of liberal democracy somewhat, note how I tried to lay it out in my dissertation.

- There are really three stories being told: (1) the history of Germany from the early 19th century till 1945 as an example of the belated- or faulted-nation model of development, and its transformation into a liberal democracy since 1945 under rather different conditions; (2) the manner in which agencies of socialization - schools, families, and cohort groups - taught adherence to political values depending on their historical relation to regime-types (and political events); and (3) the “internal” dynamic or development of liberal democracy, under favorable conditions, from mere legitimation of political institutions to acceptance of limited public conflict to political tolerance. How do these three stories fit together?
- Try to hypothesize about the development of other post-fascist liberal democracies. How fully have they overcome their prior unfavorable historical developments, including resultant party systems and forms of conflict resolution? What political values do new generations learn from their families, the schools, and their peers - and in what kind of political atmosphere? Are there major “sticking places” in the internal dynamic or development of liberal democracy - an imbalance of forces, mistrust, institutional delegitimation, rejection of all conflict, intolerance?

Themes for Next Meeting
Oppositional or Polarized Party Systems: Week 9

The analysis of political parties and party systems is an important task for many reasons, but we will concentrate on one aspect of the question: the relationship of parties and party systems to liberal democracy. More specifically, we will be interested to investigate the intermediating role that parties and party systems play between sociopolitical development and political culture (popular attitudes and participation and forms of conflict resolution) - and their effect on the chances for success of liberal democracy.

How satisfactorily can the structure of party systems and the orientation of particular parties be explained by the “crises and sequences” model of sociopolitical development? What role does the substantive content of social cleavages play in the development of parties and party systems?

- Seymour Martin Lipset, sometimes in collaboration with Stein Rokkan, has done as much as any recent scholar to elaborate the origins of parties and party systems in terms of crises and sequences of sociopolitical development - although his work has perhaps paralleled rather than stemmed from others we have read. When reading his articles, be sure to understand how they can be interpreted in this light. The articles in the LaPalombara and Weiner volume should also, of course, be understood largely in these terms.

Political parties and party systems can be considered as the “freezing” or institutionalization of salient social cleavages which were present at the point of party formation. Consider the effect of such institutionalized cleavages - perhaps under changed social (cleavage) conditions - on liberal democracy.

- In what respects does the substantive content of institutionalized social cleavages in parties have a direct effect on liberal democracy? In what respects does the disjuncture between past, institutionalized social cleavages in parties and present social cleavages not organized in parties (perhaps, rather, in social movements) affect liberal democracy? You might consider here the effects which parties have in socializing new generations of political participants, and the extent to which parties are “transmission belts” between sociopolitical development and the characteristics of the current regime form.
- Consider the extent to which “structural” aspects of parties and party systems mediate the effects of their “substantive” content on liberal democracy. LaPalombara and Weiner discuss the variety of conflictual styles institutionalized by parties, and Sartori discusses the effects of multiparty configurations of opposition. How is this structure affected by sociopolitical development, and does variation in structure (as an intervening variable) account for the effect of substantive cleavage and development on liberal democracy?

Themes for Next Meeting
Oppositional or Non-oppositional Party Systems: Week 10

Up to this point, we have been reading works mainly on developmental aspects of liberal democracy; we now turn to questions of the internal structure and dynamics of liberal democracy, and the variety of dangers it faces of internal breakdown or deformation. We begin by looking at the structuration of conflict resolution.

Consider the elements of an ideal typical form of conflict resolution in a liberal democracy.

- Note the distinction between “public” and “private,” and the way certain conflicts are regulated through state policy-making and others are kept out of this arena. Recall Schumpeter’s provisos in this regard about how much conflict a democracy can bear: keep this in mind when reading theories of governmental “overload” or “governability.” Is there room here for a concept of the “semi-public,” referring to regulation of conflict among parties and large organizations below the parliamentary level?
- What is the form of representation of interests and mediation of conflict? Note the nature of mass-elite ties and, again, the role of parties and interest groups.
- Recall the structural requisites we have discussed for what Dahl calls “civic orientations.” Schematically, they can be represented as follows: Balance of forces ! Mutual Trust ! Legitimation of a constitution framework ! Acceptance of limited public conflict and tolerance for one’s opponents.

Consider the variety of approximations, distortions, and deformations of this ideal type which would still be permissible within the bounds of practical liberal democracy. (This topic will be continued next week.)

- Dahl and Lijphart both discuss a variety of ways in which the ideal typical conditions of liberal democracy listed in the previous section are not met, but they insist that liberal democracy can still exist under less than ideal conditions. Consider the obverse of each of the items listed above and note how Dahl and Lijphart characterize them.
- What structural measures do Dahl and Lijphart suggest for dealing with: imbalance between conflict intensity and state capacity; elite difficulties in representing their constituencies and party/organization difficulties in mediating between the mass and state levels; tendencies toward sectional fragmentation or secession; power imbalance between parties or interest groups; deformation of “civic orientation” (i.e., an inappropriate political culture)?

Themes for Next Meeting
Neo-Corporatist Conflict Resolution: Week 12

Since it is usual to view corporatism (estate-based or authoritarian) as antithetical to liberal democracy, it may come as a surprise in reading analyses of “neo-corporatism” (Schmitter’s “societal corporatism” and Lehmbruch’s “liberal corporatism”) to find claims that this form of conflict resolution actually enhances liberal democracy’s chances for success. Lehmbruch (ch. 6 in Trends) and Schmitter (in Patterns and Berger) both argue that neo-corporatism permits liberal democracy to endure levels of conflict which would otherwise endanger the regime form. Note how they argue it does so.

- This observation is, of course, an implicit criticism of Schumpeter’s proviso that problem loads must be limited in liberal democracy. How effectively does it answer Schumpeter?
- On the other hand, Anderson reminds us that, to the extent that neo-corporatism skirts the national public arena of interest representation, it may thereby undermine liberal democracy after all: that no substitute has been found for parliamentary bodies for representing “public” interests. Note, however, how he balances considerations of legitimation with those of efficiency and containment of potentially severe conflict.
- How do Schmitter’s arguments regarding the development of neo-corporatism and other forms of interest intermediation relate to our analyses of the development of liberal democracy. Are these developments merely parallel, or are they causally linked?

Compare the theories of neo-corporatism to theories of consociational democracy.

- Review the last section of last week’s Themes.
- Lehmbruch suggests that they differ because neo-corporatist theories refer mainly to economic interest groups, while consociational democracy generally covers religious, ethnic, and linguistic cleavages. To what extent are they nevertheless functionally equivalent with respect to conflict resolution in liberal democracy?

Marxists like Leo Panitch have criticized theories of neo-corporatism for many of the same reasons that they criticize pluralist theories. For, to paraphrase Schattschneider, in the neo-corporatist heaven, the celestial choir sings hymns of wage-restraint and union discipline.

- Dahl defends pluralist theorists against such charges by pointing out that they never denied that some interest groups are more powerful than others - and that these groups can indeed influence conflict resolution to their own advantage. Can neo-corporatist theorists defend themselves similarly?
- Panitch asserts that we need a more sophisticated (i.e., Marxist) theory of the state and suggests that capitalists would be prepared to jettison liberal democracy cum neo-corporatism (in favor, apparently, of authoritarian corporatism) if it were not to their advantage. Is this realistic? How do neo-corporatists respond?

Themes for Next Meeting
Political Culture and Participation: Week 13

The concept of political culture as applied to the question of liberal democracy is problematical in three respects. (1) It is difficult to define political culture precisely: it certainly includes values, but where does one draw the line as one moves from there to sociopolitical action, institutions, and laws? Depending on this definition, (2) is political culture coterminous with regime type? And assuming it is not coterminous, (3) what is political culture's causal relationship, not only to regime type, but also to other developmental, institutional, and social elements we are considering in this course?

Consider the sources of political values and forms of participation.

- How do the experiences of sociopolitical development affect values and participation? Consider such factors as international relations and wars; economic level of development and performance; domestic conflict and governmental performance in maintaining civil peace. Consider also the role of political parties and party systems in socializing citizens, and the way in which this mediates the "crises and sequences" of development.
- What is the effect of the internal segmentation of the population? Consider not only class, ethnic, religious, and other social cleavages, but also the ways in which dominant national cultures and subcultures are institutionalized. How do agencies of socialization - the family, the schools, generational peer groups - interact with the elements of development. Consider especially historically "cross-cutting" effects and "institutional lags."
- Is there an identifiable internal dynamic of development, as political culture adapts to new conditions? Given a new regime form, can one identify stages of political cultural development, and if so, can one specify factors which drive this development from one stage to the next?

The debate whether value orientations influence social and political structure at all is sterile: clearly they do. The question is the character of this influence and how it becomes effective in practice.

- One approach to this question is that of legitimation of the regime type (this question has also variously been called "confidence" in government and "governability"). Note, however, the importance of carefully analyzing the generality or diffuseness of support - whether it depends only on certain aspects of the regime - and also its effectiveness and strength.
- Consider how values are translated into sociopolitical action and alignment, into institution-building, and into policy-making which affects the form of regime; and consider how existing social and political structures condition the chances of participation. Can some forms of participation be radical under one regime-type and moderate under another?

Themes for Next Meeting
Legitimation Problems: Week 14

There are perhaps two ways to think about the concept of regime legitimacy in relation to levels and forms of social conflict: in the sense that Schumpeter (and Weber before him) laid out, that all regimes, including democratic, are forms of legitimate domination; and in the more classically liberal sense that the state is the legitimate public forum in which conflict from civil society is carried out.

- When the state is seen as an agency of legitimate domination, then the concept of “overload” follows naturally from the imbalance of citizen demands for state services - and group competition for these benefits - and state capacity to provide them or to roll back demands. Note that this approach characterizes many conservatives like Huntington and Crozier, as well as leftists like Habermas (also political economists from Mancur Olson [The Rise and Decline of Nations], to Lester Thurow [The Zero-Sum Society], to James O’Connor [The Fiscal Crisis of the State]).
- When the state is seen as a legitimate public forum, then the structuration of conflict becomes more important: the state acts at most as a referee, enforcing the rules of the game and repressing those groups which violate them. Otherwise, much is left to the contending groups to aggregate and limit demands made of each other, and to keep certain matters out of the public arena. How far does Schmitter go in this direction in his article from last week on interest intermediation and regime governability?

A good deal of the debate over legitimation problems, governability, or state-overload centers around the dual questions, (1) how many areas of conflict (potential or actual) have become public? and to the extent that more areas have become public (2) how much does traditional regime-loyalty or simply inertia prevent dissatisfaction from reaching crisis proportions?

- The more the state attempts to regulate conflict areas, the more it rests its legitimation on social accord in those areas. Habermas argues that the historical trend under capitalism in democratic regimes has been that the state has increased its responsibility for performance in several areas - especially economic - and thus becomes vulnerable to de-legitimation from several directions. What is Bell’s critique of this theory? What do theorists of liberal democratic conflict resolution have to say about such theories?
- Lane and Crozier both argue that traditional values prevent a complete breakdown of legitimation; Habermas argues that these values have been eroded. Who is right? Can federalism, localism, and intermediate groups - traditional liberal means of preventing governmental centralization - also forestall a thorough-going legitimation crisis? can a reduction of participation?

Background Themes
Nineteenth Century Theories: Suggested Readings

Note the distinctions which are made between liberal and democratic elements: between freedom and equality.

- How are the lines of debate drawn between liberals, who fear tyranny of the majority, and Marx the socialist, who asserts that liberty without greater equality is impossible?
- What are the chief causes of tyranny for Tocqueville and Mill: what inherent dangers are there for breakdown of liberal democracy? At what points do they agree with Marx's economic arguments?

Note that all three theorists expected that political participation would serve as an education which would make citizens more capable of democratic participation.

- What is the nature of participation in a liberal democracy for Tocqueville and Mill, and in a communist society for Marx?
- What is the nature of the participant societies: what is each theorist's notion of a public good, and how does it shape his characterization of liberal democracy or communist society?
- Each also expected a personality change or growth: how was this to come about?
- What does each theorist say about the role of citizenship?
- How does each regard individualism, and what is its relation to public life?

What factors play the greatest roles in the development of liberal democracy for each theorist?

- Note the status of such factors as political institutions and state structure, class structure, ethnic composition of the population, "political culture" (figure out what this could mean here), religion, industrialization.
- Is there any sequence of development which is most favorable for liberal democracy in these theories?
- Does a revolutionary inception help or hinder the chances of liberal democracy?
- What role, if any, do parties, interest groups, and other associations play?

How is social and political conflict regarded by each theorist? How is social solidarity regarded, and what is its relation to conflict?

- How does each theorist expect conflict to be resolved and democratic policy decisions to be reached?