

“The Effects of Diffusion, Nostalgia, and Performance on  
Democratic Legitimation in Unified Germany:  
An Analysis Using Structural Equations Models”

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"The Effects of Diffusion, Nostalgia, and Performance on  
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An Analysis Using Structural Equations Models"<sup>1</sup>

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We are now some twenty years into the "third wave" of democratization, which started in the mid-1970s and has continued into the 1990s (Huntington 1991). By now, some of the countries that first initiated transitions have consolidated their democracies. Others, including the post-1989 transitions, are at various stages of consolidation, or lack of it. In accounting for these developments, the literature on democratization has progressed from questions of transition to questions of consolidation. And inevitably, this literature has begun to address questions of legitimation, for the consolidation of democracy - a regime premised on citizen input - entails the development of reliable citizen support.

The intersection of the literatures on democratization and legitimation has generated a huge number of hypotheses. Writers have argued that democratic legitimation after a transition depends on such factors as the level of socioeconomic development or the development of civil society; the capacity and professionalism of state agencies; the coinciding of state and national boundaries; government success in assuring civil peace and prosperity or avoiding war; the configuration of the party system, government coalitions, or elites; the nature of the transition itself; the prestige and attractiveness of democracy in the world; the actions of other countries or transnational agencies; the unattractiveness of the prior nondemocratic regime or the past experience of conflict.

Weil (1993) presented a graph of democratic legitimation in several countries before and after a transition to democracy, measured by approval of a multiparty system or a system in which more than one leader rules. This graph, slightly updated,

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<sup>1</sup>Note to the Reader: This conference paper is a draft of a work in progress. I do not anticipate that the content will change greatly in the final draft, but some sections still need work. In particular, the introduction and literature review must be brought up to date. I would also like to add one final step to the empirical analysis. If you would like to receive a later draft, please contact me at [fweil@lsu.edu](mailto:fweil@lsu.edu).

is shown as **Figure 1**.<sup>2</sup> Two features are immediately apparent. First, in most cases, legitimation begins at less than consensus, rises rapidly over the early years of the new democracy, and levels off at near-consensus. Second, different countries cross the transition line at different starting points, and these starting points seem to rise with more recent transitions. Weil (1989, 1993, 1994) suggested that citizens' positive experience with democracy might account for the shape of these curves, but not for their starting level, because there could be no experience of the regime yet at the moment of its birth. He suggested that two other factors might account for the starting level: how attractive citizens thought democracy looked in foreign countries, and how strongly they rejected the prior regime in their own country.

Of course, other factors might also account for the different starting points, including several items from the above list, like level of socioeconomic development, development of civil society, "nation-stateness," and probably others. Still, Weil attempted to summarize the main causes of democratic legitimation in three categories: (1) citizens' experience with the functioning of democracy itself, especially the opposition structure, (2) the attractiveness of other democracies ("demonstration effects," "value diffusion," or "snowballing"), and (3) rejection of the old regime ("historical preferences" or lack of "nostalgia"). In a comprehensive survey of the literature on democratization, Shin (1994) cites almost the same three factors, although he highlights civil society rather than opposition structure for the first factor.

There is broad agreement in the literature that the first factor - citizens' experience with democracy - is important in the growth of legitimation, although there is much debate about which aspects are most important. There is much less agreement about whether diffusion or nostalgia play a role at all. In this paper, I focus on these two disputed factors. While I do not argue that they are most important, I try to show that they cannot be completely discounted. I begin by reviewing the literature on democratic legitimation and distill a base-line model of the causes of legitimation in new democracies, expanding on the three-part model just described. I then describe an opinion survey conducted in east and west Germany in December 1992 and test an

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<sup>2</sup>Question texts, years, and sources are listed in Appendix A. Plasser and Ulram [1993, figs. 27-28] show that Austria and Italy reached the same near-consensus levels as Germany by the early 1990s, and they present results for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland consistent with the levels in Figure 1. (I believe they used the identical question text as the one shown in Figure 1 for East and West Germany.) Their data could not be incorporated into Figure 1 because they presented approval, rather than rejection, of a one-party system, and they did not indicate how the "don't knows" were handled.

elaborated model of democratic legitimation. The elaborated model reflects the strengths and limitations of a case study: it is able to examine particularities of the case in greater detail, but it is unable to test certain more general factors directly.

## A BASE-LINE MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION AFTER A TRANSITION

Democratic legitimation is a form of political support, and it consists of two parts, (a) citizens' evaluations, and (b) the politically-relevant objects that they evaluate. A well-organized literature distinguishes among different levels of citizen evaluation, ranging from abstract philosophical preference for democratic ideals to approval of specific actions of political incumbents. Easton's (1965, 1975; also Parsons 1967) distinction between diffuse system support and specific evaluation of state outputs or performance is probably the most influential. Other typologies generally tap the same dimension. For instance, Held (1987, pp. 181-2, 238) identifies seven levels of acceptance of political institutions, on a continuum from coercion to a belief that the institutions satisfy one's normative ideals. Recent empirical studies generally build on these or similar distinctions (e.g., Fuchs 1996, 1997; Fuchs and Roller 1994; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Weil 1989; Westle 1989).

The analysis of the causes of legitimation requires attention to the objects of political support. The literature here is vast, but less well organized. This is not the place for a full literature review, but two distinctions can help us make sense of the myriad of explanations. First, we may distinguish attributes of democracy itself from exogenous factors that influence citizens' evaluations of democracy. And second, we may distinguish citizens' direct experience with the performance of a democratic regime from other factors, including conditions existing before or during a transition to democracy.

These two distinctions yield a four-fold classification of hypotheses, shown in **Figure 2**. The first hypothesis (in cell a), "Democratic Performance," states that citizens support democracy to the extent that they actually experience well-functioning democratic processes in action. The most important of these processes is the opposition structure: the party system, the configuration of governing coalitions, and interactions among political actors. The second hypothesis (cell b), "State and Economic Performance," states that support for democracy depends on the regime's delivery of goods and services. Efficient state agencies, a good economy, and civil peace promote democratic attitudes. The third hypothesis (cell c), "Demonstration Effects" or "Diffusion," states that citizens support democracy to the extent that they admire it in other countries, even if they have not (yet) experienced it in their own country. The fourth hypothesis (cell d), "Preconditions for Democracy," is a residual

category - and thus possibly undertheorized - and it can take several forms. For instance, some scholars argue that countries can become democratic only if they have reached a certain stage of socioeconomic development. Others argue that it depends on countries' resolving their nationality- or ethnic problems, or that it depends on certain types of class structure. A fifth hypothesis, "Historical Preferences" or "Nostalgia" cross-cuts the two performance hypotheses (cells a and b). Citizens compare the present regime with the former regime according to democratic and exogenous criteria. If citizens prefer present performance, we say that they are not nostalgic.

This four-fold-plus-one classification yields a base-line model of the causes of democratic legitimation. Interestingly, much of the recent debate in the literature between proponents of "structural preconditions" for democracy and "process theorists" of democracy (e.g., Karl 1990; Kitschelt 1992; Lipset 1994) - or "first- and second-generation" theorists of democracy (Evans and Whitefield 1995) - actually contrasts only the main diagonal cells "a" and "d" of Figure 2, and leaves out the minor diagonal cells "b" and "c." Hopefully, attention to all four-plus-one cells will give us a fuller view. Let us briefly examine the five hypotheses, in roughly the historical order in which they were developed.

### **Preconditions for Democracy.**

Lipset (1981 [1960]), in his classic study, argues that democracy depends on an advanced level of socioeconomic development. He presents this thesis broadly. Richer countries are more likely to be democratic, and richer sectors of society are more likely to be democratic. This, he argues, is largely because economic development promotes education, enlightenment, and middle class orientations, which in turn promote democratic values. Quantitative studies have confirmed that the correlation between the level of socioeconomic development and democracy is robust (e.g., Bollen 1979; Lipset, Seong and Torres 1993; Gasiorowski 1995), and in spite of debates on other points, qualitative studies have also acknowledged this covariance (e.g., Moore 1966; Therborn 1977; Huntington 1991; Luebbert 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). However, democracy does not automatically come with development, as dependency theorists noted of Latin America in the 1970s (e.g., O'Donnell 1979), or observers noted of Eastern Europe prior to 1989. Rather, as Huntington (1991) puts it, a high level of development puts a country into a political "transition zone" in which democracy is possible, but not assured.

A second precondition for democracy is what Linz and Stepan (1996) call "nation-stateness." Two conditions challenge democracy, (a) when national or ethnic boundaries do not correspond to state boundaries, and (b) when the state does not

have the capacity to enact policy. Since most democracies (or would-be democracies) are, in fact, ethnically diverse, Linz and Stepan recommend a variety of measures for reducing the disruptiveness of ethnic identity, including the development of multiple identities, federal state structures, and proportional representation, among others.

"Process theorists" of the late 1980s and 1990s criticized the "futile search for new preconditions" for democracy (Karl 1990, p. 19) and proposed that observers look instead for how democratizers cobble together the new regime (e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; DiPalma 1990). However, third parties to the debate have argued that the two approaches are mutually compatible (e.g., Kitschelt 1992); and many of the "preconditions theorists" now agree (e.g., Lipset 1994, p. 16; Gasiorowski 1995). Huntington (1991) argues that just as preconditions do not guarantee democratization, and just as a transition may depend on certain processes - to the same extent, new democracies are much more likely to fall back into authoritarianism if they lack the preconditions to consolidate democracy.

### **State and Economic Performance**

A second, and equally venerable, proposition states that democratic legitimation requires good state and economic performance (e.g., Schumpeter 1975 [1950]; Lipset 1981 [1960]). To be sure, scholars argue, the legitimacy of non-democracies is more vulnerable than that of democracies if their performance is bad (Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). Democracies have loyal oppositions that can offer alternative policies to deal with performance problems. The only alternatives in non-democracies is another regime. Likewise, new democracies are more vulnerable than old, well-established democracies. Old democracies have reservoirs of legitimacy that new democracies have not yet built up. And post-communist democracies are more vulnerable than post-authoritarian democracies. Post-communist countries face dual transitions - to democracy and to a market economy - while most post-authoritarian democracies already had market economies under the old regime.

Thus, Przeworski (1991) and Ekiert (1991, 1993) argue that the post-communist dual transition creates severe hardships whether economic reform is conducted rapidly or slowly (see also Headey, Andorka, and Krause 1995). Even if reform is rapid ("shock therapy"), the pay-off of an improved economy is likely to come after the current electoral cycle. That is, economic reformers, who are generally also democratic reformers, are often punished at the ballot box or in the streets. In a long-term democracy, we would expect this dissatisfaction to manifest itself as rejection of incumbents, not rejection of the regime. Yet, the political opposition to market-democratic parties in Eastern Europe after 1989 was often populist nationalists or post-communist parties (Janos 1994; Kitschelt 1995a, 1995b). Przeworski and Ekiert both

feared (at the time of their writing) that since the incumbents were pro-market democrats and the opposition parties were semi-disloyal, protest against the incumbents might escalate to rejection of democracy (cf. Rose's [1992] more optimistic version of this thesis).

However, some scholars doubt that economic performance is so important. Linz and Stepan (1989, 1996) argue that democratic legitimacy is not strongly dependent on state and economic performance, if regime alternatives are not attractive. If a "third way" or a return to the old regime are not attractive, then the population will support the present democracy enthusiastically or by default. Indeed, Linz and Stepan (1996, ch. 19, 21) go so far as to argue that putting economic performance ahead of democratic state structuring endangers both democratization and marketization. At least in post-communist transitions, citizens have different time horizons for marketization and democratization. They have patience for economic improvement and do not want to sacrifice democratization for it (Linz and Stepan, 1996 pp. 439ff; also Rose and Mishler 1994). Elsewhere, Linz (1988) gives another reason for this resilience. Due to the rise of international economic interdependence, especially compared to the 1930s, the "accountability" (Zurechnung) of the state for economic performance has drastically declined. Even if the population believed that an alternative regime would seek to improve economic performance, they are increasingly skeptical than any regime - even a populist one - would have the ability to succeed. Thus, they have little incentive to throw away a regime that is at least politically attractive for no certain economic improvement. As Huntington (1991, p. 263) puts it, "Democracies become consolidated when people learn that democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily to anything else."

Poor state performance probably dampens democratic legitimacy more than poor economic performance. O'Donnell (1994) identifies a class of "delegative democracies" that merely limp along. They are unlikely to revert to authoritarianism, but they are also unable to consolidate or become strongly legitimated. The president in such countries, once elected, governs with little regard for formal rule of law, often ruling in a populist and technocratic fashion. If the president governs successfully, few problems may emerge. But if his or her performance is poor, the only alternative to waiting for the next presidential election may be impeachment. The resulting deadlock can erode democratic legitimacy.<sup>3</sup> Linz and Stepan (1996) also argue that democracy

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<sup>3</sup>See the parallel debate about the "perils of presidentialism" in Linz (1990a, 1990b); Lipset (1990); Lijphart (1991); Zielonka (1994). Huntington (1991) expresses skepticism that the debate has been resolved. And O'Donnell (1996) himself backtracks somewhat, saying that delegative democracies can muddle along with

is impossible if the state does not have the capacity to act effectively. When the state cannot perform adequately, legitimation is likely to suffer. And Fuchs and Roller (1994; also Fuchs 1996, 1997) identify a level of government (Regierung) performance part-way between economic performance and the performance of democratic institutions. While they do not expect economic performance to affect legitimacy, they do think government and democratic performance will. Thus, state performance, defined in various ways, seems somewhat more likely to affect legitimacy than economic performance, but somewhat less likely than democratic performance, which I examine next.

### **Democratic Performance**

"Process theorists" stress the importance of endogenous political factors in democratic transitions. Observers have described pacting between regime soft-liners and opposition moderates (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1987), the path of transition (Karl 1990; Karl and Schmitter 1991), the nature of the former regime (Linz and Stepan 1996), and relations among elites (Burton and Higley 1987; Higley and Burton 1989; Higley and Pakulski 1994).

However, while these factors are clearly relevant to democratic transitions, their relevance to democratic consolidation and legitimation is less clear. Opposition structure is probably the most important factor in democratic consolidation and legitimation.<sup>4</sup> Citizen support for democracy grows best in a regime with a well-functioning opposition structure - especially the party system and coalition structure. A non-polarized party system and a coalition structure that permits choice and alternance are most important; but party-system fragmentation and volatility also play a role. Thus, the longer a democracy survives, the greater the reservoir of legitimation it acquires, and in turn, the more it will be capable of surviving state and economic performance crises. This is due to citizens' experience with the regime form: the longer citizens live in a country with a responsive opposition structure, the more they adhere to democratic values. Older democracies have deeper reservoirs of legitimation. Conversely, in the absence of countervailing factors, citizens will not support democracy until they have seen it in operation for some time. They will not support

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plenty of corruption and patronage, and still perform better and achieve higher levels of legitimacy than democracies with more formal state structures. Still, O'Donnell prefers greater state formalism.

<sup>4</sup>For a fuller discussion and citations, see Weil (1989, 1994). Some of the text in this and the next two sections closely follows Weil (1993, 1994).

democratic values immediately after a transition to democracy. Therefore, there will be some lag after a regime transition until legitimation begins to grow.

Opposition structure also tends to filter out the effects of poor economic and state performance. As long as a credible democratic opposition is available to take office and address the problems, poor performance is unlikely to undermine democratic legitimation. To be sure, poor performance may drive down citizens' confidence or trust in the administration and make them want to vote the incumbents out (Lipset and Schneider 1983; Weil 1989). But such a "confidence gap" is not the same as the delegitimation of democracy. State and economic performance problems may be necessary to undermine legitimation, but they are not sufficient.

### **Demonstration Effects or Diffusion**

Like democratic preconditions, demonstration effects or diffusion can affect the starting level of democratic legitimation, before citizens have yet experienced the new regime in action. Foreign democracies can serve as models that either attract or repel citizens of non-democracies. Broadly speaking, the more prestige existing democracies have, the more citizens of non-democracies will want to emulate them. British political institutions were a model for many Europeans and Americans in the eighteenth century. In contrast, the prestige of democracy was low among populations of authoritarian countries in the middle of the twentieth century because democracies were in crisis themselves in the interwar period and doing badly at war until about 1943-45. The success of the post-1945 democracies contributed to the growing prestige of democracy in the world, which helped fuel the Third Wave of democratizations since the 1970s. Such demonstration effects probably flow most effectively among "reference groups" of countries that believe their conditions are comparable. Thus, after Franco's death, the Spanish population could take the successful construction of democracy in West Germany after Nazism as a model, even if Anglo-American models were regarded with distaste for other reasons. And media influences were probably greater in East Germany than in other Eastern European countries, because East Germans received not just western propaganda broadcasts, but also the same broadcasts that West Germans received themselves. Thus, demonstration effects or diffusion can serve as a functional equivalent to a reservoir of legitimation that otherwise takes years to build up.

A substantial literature exists on diffusion in fields like technological innovation, and social geography or spatial sociology (e.g., Grubler 1996; Land, Dean, and Blau 1991). The literature on the diffusion of political phenomena is spottier (e.g., Wellhofer 1989; McAdam and Rucht 1993), and only a few works are devoted exclusively to the diffusion of democracy (esp. Starr 1991). Most other studies of democratization

mention demonstration effects only in passing. Huntington (1991, ch. 2, 6) lists "snowballing" and "reverse snowballing" as one of several means by which democracy may spread (or contract) in the world. He notes that the global media now play a major role in making people aware of conditions in other countries, and that diffusion is most likely to occur among countries that are proximate or culturally similar. However, he believes that both snowballing and reverse snowballing have most influence on elites, not the mass population. Along the same lines, Linz and Stepan (1996, pp. 74-76) list Zeitgeist and diffusion effects among the causes of democratization, and also cite the influence of modern media. Even a staunch structuralist like Gasiorowski (1995, p. 893) finds that having democratic neighbors facilitates a country's democratization. He believes that his finding "indicates that the emphasis placed on 'demonstration effects' in much of the recent literature is well founded."

### **Historical Comparisons and Nostalgia**

After a democratic transition, citizens inevitably compare the new system to the pre-transition system. Historical comparisons or nostalgia refer to the different types of performance we have just examined: the performance of democracy itself, the government in office, state agencies, the economy and civil peace, and - if there has been a change from a command to a market economy - the economic system. Everything else being equal, we should expect that democratic legitimation is most influenced by comparisons of performance closest to democracy itself, and least influenced by comparisons to state and economic performance.

Citizens judge democracy not only on its own terms, but also in comparison to the previous regime or regimes. If the change seems to be for the better, legitimation will be higher; if the change seems to be for the worse, legitimation will be lower. Various factors come into play here. When regime changes were imposed by outside forces, as was the case after 1945 in West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan, it took some time before populations became convinced that the change was for the better. In contrast, when democracy was introduced by domestic forces, as was the case in Spain and Portugal in the mid-1970s and in Eastern Europe after 1989, preference for democracy may grow extremely rapidly. Populations experience such euphoria that they "anticipate" improvements before they actually occur. Their willingness to lend legitimation credit to a new regime may serve as a functional equivalent to the reservoir of legitimacy enjoyed by older democracies. Such a "honeymoon period" may help new regimes weather difficult times initially, but it is unlikely to prove permanent if opposition structures do not improve.

Historical comparisons can be especially pointed for citizens who benefitted from the old regime or who were more strongly socialized by it. Thus, former state officials

or members of the leading party may be hesitant to support democracy after a transition. Also, those who came of age during the old regime and were taught its ideals - especially those who received elite education - may also lag in supporting democracy (see, e.g., Weil 1985, 1987). However, several factors qualify these propositions. The cognitive element of education may outweigh the socialization element, and the better educated may be especially attuned to demonstration effects and become strong supporters of the new democratic regime earlier than others. Also, some elites may be adaptable, enter high positions in the new regime, and end up supporting it, just as they supported the old regime. Observers have noted that some "new capitalists" in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are simply old apparatchiks and plant managers who "bought" privatized enterprises by questionable means. And some authors even argue that since socialist doctrine has democratic components, strong socialists in a post-communist democracy may also become strong democrats - albeit, socialist democrats (e.g., Westle 1994).

Still, citizens need not fully reject the old regime to become convinced democrats. As DiPalma (1990, 1993) and Linz and Stepan (1996) argue, one does not necessarily need democrats to build a democracy. As in the Weimar Republic, many citizens of third wave democracies become transformed from "republicans of the head" to "republicans of the heart" as they are impelled to pursue their preferences in a democratic setting, and as they experience the workings of democratic processes. Yet, Linz and Stepan (1996, ch. 9) probably go too far when they argue that it hardly matters how citizens feel about the previous authoritarian regime. Even though citizens who admire the old regime can become converts to democracy, citizens who reject the old regime are still more likely to be convinced democrats - at least, unless the two groups converge with the passage of time.

## **EVIDENCE IN THE LITERATURE FOR THE BASE-LINE MODEL**

The empirical literature on the determinants of democratic legitimation is huge, yet as with the theoretical literature, it is only moderately well organized. Again, rather than conduct a full literature review, I summarize selected findings according to the base-line model I have outlined. For the general case, I review research on the effects of democracy itself (democratic performance and diffusion) and then exogenous factors (preconditions and state/economic performance). For the case of Germany, most empirical literature centers on a debate whether socialization (due to regime performance) or value diffusion is more important. Findings on nostalgia cross-cut all this literature, and I mention them at various points in my review.

## **The General Case**

### Attributes of Democracy Itself (Democratic Performance and Diffusion).

There is a good deal of evidence in the literature that the attributes of democracy affect system success in general and legitimation in particular. Zimmermann and Saalfeld (1988) have shown that party system polarization reduced the chances for democratic survival in the 1920s and 1930s, but that economic factors were indeterminate. Many studies of cabinet instability come to similar conclusions. Dodd (1976), Powell (1982), Luebbert (1986), Zimmermann (1987, 1988), and Nolte (1988) show that party-system fragmentation and polarization, and the presence of anti-system parties all contributed to cabinet instability in the interwar and the post-1945 periods. Along the same lines, Higley's studies of elite settlements show that the movement away from extreme conflict, called elite consolidation, is consistent with democracy, whereas ideological suppression of conflict is not (Higley and Burton 1989; Higley and Gunther 1992; Higley and Pakulski 1994). In research on western Europe and the United States, Weil (1989, 1994) found that a poorly functioning opposition structure, but not economic performance, reduced democratic legitimation and trust in government since World War II, and compromised democratic survival in the 1930s. The same research showed evidence of value diffusion and "honeymoon periods," especially in "third wave" democracies. And in related work, Weil (1981, 1982, 1985, 1991) found that a well-functioning opposition structure also promotes ethnic and political tolerance.

Scholars have found similar evidence for regions outside North America and Western Europe, as well. In an analysis of survey data from post-communist European countries, Fuchs and Roller (1994) argue that (1) due to demonstration effects, support for democracy will initially be high, but (2) the consolidation of this support depends on positive experience with the functioning of democracy. They distinguish support for the culture of democracy (liberties, legal equality), the structure of democracy (parliamentary institutions, multipartism), evaluation of democracy's functioning, expectation that democracy can solve the country's problems, and approval of government and economic performance. In pooled analysis, the functioning of democracy is fairly well explained by government performance, economic performance, the problem-solving capacity of democracy, and the belief that western institutions have been implemented. The problem-solving capacity of democracy and government performance are both explained by economic performance. Fuchs and Roller argue that democracy has had a strong start, but faces a difficult road ahead: according to data from 1990-93, evaluations of democracy's performance declined.

Toka (1995) investigates the impact of "demonstration effects," a "honeymoon

period," and economic performance on regime legitimation in the new democracies East-Central Europe. Overall, he finds, economic performance was the strongest predictor of regime support. Legitimation declined shortly after the transition because of bad economic performance - although Toka believes it may rise again if performance recovers. Yet, while the steep drop-off of legitimation can be explained by economic performance, its initially high level cannot. Rather, Toka argues, the strong early support for the regime shows the influence of western models and honeymoon periods. Elsewhere, Toka (1996) investigates the effect of the party system on democratic legitimacy. His most important finding is that east European countries do not differ substantially from older democracies. Structural features of the party system (especially complexity) matter most, not the age of regime. Thus, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, with simpler party systems, have levels of legitimacy more similar to the west than do Poland and Hungary, with their more complex party systems.

Mishler and Rose (1994) also find evidence of "historical preferences" in post-communist democracies. In 1991 surveys in eastern Europe and Austria, they ask whether respondents predict that parliament and parties will be suspended and whether they want this to happen. Support for parliament is high in eastern Europe, though lower than in Austria. Mishler and Rose find that evaluation of past, present, and (predicted) future regimes are correlated with support for parliament. Those who approve of the past communist regime are more likely to want parliament and parties suspended than are supporters of the present (or future) democratic regime.

Other regions show similar patterns. In an analysis of Latin America in the 1980s, Remmer (1991) argues that opposition structure (party system structure) mediates the impact of economic crises on democracy. While economic problems "undermined support for incumbents and provoked high levels of electoral volatility," they did not necessarily "foster the growth of political extremism or the exhaustion of elite consensus associated with the breakdown of democracy. The...relationship between economic conditions and electoral instability is mediated by party system structure rather than democratic age. Paradoxically, the findings buttress prior research on electoral outcomes in the comparatively stable and homogeneous OECD nations while undercutting theoretical frameworks elaborated with specific reference to the breakdown and consolidation of Third World democracy." (Remmer 1991, p. 777)

And in an analysis of South Korean surveys, Shin (1995) shows that democratic attitudes were learned from experience with a democracy, not that democracy came into being because the population had democratic attitudes beforehand. He notes that in Korea, like Spain but unlike Eastern Europe, prosperity was achieved under the authoritarian regime, so democratization was not seen as a way of improving the economy. Shin also argues that democratic attitudes are more a result of a learning

process based on experience than of exposure to western media and education (diffusion). As noted earlier and detailed below, this is a central point of contention in empirical studies of the German case.

Factors Exogenous to Democracy (Preconditions and State/Economic Performance).

Relatively little empirical research has been done on the effects of democratic preconditions on legitimation, mainly because so few survey data sets contain sufficient variance on developmental level or nation-stateness (exceptions include Inglehart 1990; Abramson and Inglehart 1995). Rather, most survey analysts investigate preconditions indirectly, for instance, by interpreting educational or generational effects on democratic values - or lack of them - as evidence of the effects of development (e.g., Stouffer 1955; Lipset 1981 [1960]; Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1996).<sup>5</sup> Other studies treat preconditions as a threshold or "framing" condition for democratic attitudes (e.g., Maravall and Santamaria 1986; Shin 1995). According to this approach, different levels of socioeconomic development or nation-stateness can account for countries' different starting levels of legitimation at the point of their transition to democracy (as in Figure 1).

There is much more empirical research on the effects of state and economic performance, but the evidence is mixed. Some researchers have found that economic performance affects democratic legitimacy (e.g., Dalton 1994; Gluchowski and Zelle 1992; McIntosh and MacIver 1992, 1993; Rose and Mishler 1994; Toka 1995). Others have found that the economy has little or no effect (e.g., Weil 1989, 1994; Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Remmer 1991; Headey, Andorka, and Krause 1995; Wessels and Klingemann 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996, ch. 14). Still others have obtained mixed results (e.g., Mishler and Rose 1996; Rose and Page 1996; Plasser and Ulram 1994; Fuchs and Roller 1994; Roller, Wessels, Fuchs, and Klingemann 1994; Shin 1995).

To some extent, researchers have attempted to account for this variability by citing Kinder and Kiewiet's (1981) distinction between egocentric (personal) and sociotropic (national) economic effects. They posit that citizens are more likely to evaluate democracy according to the national economy than their personal well-being. However, two other distinctions are probably more important. First, it matters whether

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<sup>5</sup>However, some scholars have expressed doubts that education's effect is universal, or that it is caused by socioeconomic development rather than, say, state socialization in regime values (e.g., Weil 1982, 1985, 1991; Finifter 1996).

democratic legitimacy is measured in terms of ideals or practical evaluations of the existing regime. Most investigators find that state and economic performance influences evaluations of the existing democratic regime more than democratic ideals: indeed, performance often has no effect on ideals at all (Fuchs and Roller 1994; Roller, Wessels, Fuchs, and Klingemann 1994; Shin 1995). Second, as noted earlier, legitimacy is less sensitive to performance problems in more "mature" or consolidated democracies. In mature democracies, preference for a democratic regime is more decoupled from preferences for certain policies, parties, or incumbents.

Scholars have also investigated whether preference for the economic system - socialism or capitalism - affects democratic legitimation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Despite vigorous debates on the determinants of support for a market economy, most scholars have found that preference for capitalism or socialism has surprisingly little effect on support for democracy (Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992; Finifter 1996; Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1994; Miller, Reisinger and Hesli 1996, p. 164; Gibson 1996; McIntosh and Maclver 1993).

### **The Case of Post-Communist Eastern Germany**

Much of the literature on democratic legitimation in East Germany revolves around a debate whether value diffusion or socialization under the old regime is more important in determining support for the present regime. Some scholars focus mainly on the demonstration effects of western political culture. Thus, Weil (1993) argues that the high levels of support for democracy in East Germany immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall - levels that did not emerge for twenty years or more in West Germany after Nazism - could hardly have been due to citizens' direct experience with democracy. Rather, he suggests, they may have been due to the diffusion of democratic values, especially through the media, and/or lack of nostalgia for the past regime.

Likewise, Kaase and Klingemann (1994) posited that East Germans developed a "virtual" identification with western parties through western TV. They compared three models of partisanship. (1) In a Direct-exposure Long-term Learning model, partisanship is proportionate to the duration of party system, and would thus be lower in east. (2) In a Current Events Model, previous socialization has little effect, and eastern and western partisanship would be about the same. And (3) in an Indirect-exposure Long-term Learning Model or "Outside Learning" Model, easterners learn through TV and are only somewhat behind westerners. Most of the authors' empirical evidence supported the third model, but they found that direct learning has already begun. In a related study, Klingemann and Hofferbert (1994) attributed the strong democratic

values already evident in East Germany months after the fall of the Berlin Wall to a media-driven "indirect exposure, long-term learning model."

Roller (1994) found similar effects in economic orientations. East Germans had mixed feelings with regard to a market economy. They supported the achievement principle (success rewarded), but also government intervention in the economy. Roller interprets these results according to a distinction between an "outside learning model" and an "inside learning model." In the former, attributes are learned by the models of successful foreign countries; in the latter, they are learned domestically by experience. "The outside learning model works with respect to those elements of a given system that people are dissatisfied with." People were satisfied with government intervention, but not with domestic achievement.

Friedrich (1990) also found evidence of diffusion effects, but from a very different perspective. In perhaps the only opinion surveys conducted in the GDR, the Central Institute for Youth Research in Leipzig asked young people from 1970 to 1990 their opinions about socialism, Marxism-Leninism, solidarity with the USSR, and other issues. Friedrich found that socialist values consolidated in the 1970s, stagnated in the late 1970s, resurged in the early 1980s, and virtually collapsed from 1985 to 1989 - even as solidarity with the USSR grew - as Gorbachev pursued his policies of glasnost and perestroika. Thus, diffusion of democratic values from the west may not have been the only external influence on eastern populations. Gorbachev's reforms may have also helped weaken socialist or anti-western attitudes.

Other scholars have argued strenuously against diffusion effects and in favor of socialization under the old regime. Thus, Westle (1994) is skeptical of "virtual" socialization through the western media. Instead, she argues that long-term socialization in socialist values contributed to democratic attitudes because easterners see socialism and democracy as compatible (i.e., democratic socialism). Socialist values merely underwent a latent phase during the transition and unification process, and re-emerged when conditions became more difficult. Both an economic "third way" and the idea of socialism (not its practice in the GDR) remained very popular in the east. She distinguishes between the idea and the reality of democracy and the idea and the reality of socialism (creating a four-fold distinction). In the east, the idea of democracy correlates positively with the idea of socialism, but there is no such correlation in the west. In both east and west, all three remaining quadrants are negatively correlated. In the west, half the population thinks socialism and democracy are compatible; in the east, 60-70 percent think so. Thus, she argues, easterners have a different model of democracy in mind. Those who think of democratic socialism are more interested in direct participation and greater equality.

Fuchs (1996, 1997) takes an intermediate position between these views. Western influence might be compatible with socialist residues, he argues, depending on the sort of democratic values. Fuchs identifies four normative types of democracy theory - liberal, libertarian, socialist, and republican - and speculates that west and east Germans embrace different types of democracy. Reviewing opinion surveys, he finds that citizens in both parts of Germany support democracy in principle, and they both define democracy according to the same basic characteristics. Yet beyond this, westerners support a liberal democracy and easterners support a socialist democracy. Thus, westerners prefer freedom, and easterners prefer equality. However, while easterners support the principle of socialism, they rejected its practice, and they support democracy more than they do socialism. Similarly, both easterners and westerners support the principles of democracy more than they do its practice in the Federal Republic. Fuchs speculates that the two parts of Germany may be converging on a social-liberal model of democracy.

Rohrschneider (1996a, 1996b, 1996c, unpublished) takes a somewhat different intermediate position, arguing that diffusion is only important in certain circumstances. In studies of elites (representatives to the united Berlin parliament) and the general public, he finds that while easterners are just as committed to general democratic values as westerners, they are less tolerant, less pluralistic, and less market-oriented. Rohrschneider argues that while lip-service to general democratic values can be learned by diffusion or exposure to western media, tolerance, pluralism, and market orientations must be learned in practice. He also argues that if western values really influenced easterners, then younger elites and masses should hold more "western" values than their older fellows, but the opposite is the case. Instead, Rohrschneider argues in favor of institutional learning: growing up and living in the GDR socialized easterners in "eastern" values, and diffusion effects were unable to overcome this influence.

Thus, there is a good deal of support in the literature for the base-line model in Figure 2, but there is also debate about elements of it. First, researchers have shown that a well-functioning opposition structure promotes democratic legitimation in both older western- and newer eastern democracies. Second, investigators have argued that the attractiveness of western countries helped strengthen democratic attitudes or partisan attachments in new democracies. They have variously called this influence "demonstration effects," "value diffusion," an "indirect-exposure long-term learning model," an "outside learning model," and "virtual socialization." Third, analysts have shown that when citizens are not nostalgic for the old regime, they are more likely to support the new democratic regime, even if the new democracy is going through difficult times. This effect has sometimes been called "historical preferences" or a "honeymoon period." Fourth, opinions are mixed about the importance of state and

economic performance on regime support. Some evidence shows that economic well-being helps promote democratic legitimation, but many studies - especially those that control for other variables in the base-line model - fail to find any such influence. Considerably more evidence shows that state or government performance affects democratic legitimation - at least when the latter is measured as approval of the existing regime, not as ideals. Fifth, rather little research has been done on the effect of "democratic preconditions" on legitimacy, probably because it requires comparable public opinion data that covers such a wide range of time and space. And finally, some researchers believe that socialist values themselves may be an important source of democratic values - though perhaps of a different kind: socialist democracy rather than liberal democracy.

However, the hypotheses in the base-line model have not always been tested adequately. Rather, in many cases, investigators simply note that their pattern of results is consistent with one or another proposition. The diffusion and nostalgia hypotheses, in particular, have seldom been tested directly with appropriate variables, and when they have, important control variables are often lacking. The democratic performance or democratic preconditions hypotheses are also rarely tested directly, but this time, mainly because the necessary cross-national and/or time-series data are still so rare. The effects of the economy and of socialist values on democratic attitudes have been tested quite frequently, but controls for the other variables have been spotty.

The present paper also cannot provide a complete test of the base-line model in Figure 2. In particular, since it is not based on cross-national and/or time-series surveys, it cannot directly test the influence of the opposition structure or democratic preconditions. However, it does assess the influence of the other factors: the diffusion of western political culture, nostalgia for the old regime, feelings about state and economic performance, and socialist values, together with certain background controls. The next sections describe the hypotheses and data.

## **AN ELABORATED MODEL AND HYPOTHESES**

**Figure 3** shows an elaborated model to test these hypotheses for eastern Germany since 1989. It modifies the base-line model in Figure 2 in several ways: it drops the performance of the opposition structure and democratic preconditions because they do not vary in a single-case, cross-sectional survey; it adds some background controls; it includes socialist values as an intervening variable (though this will later be dropped: see below); and it distinguishes democratic ideals from the evaluation of democratic practice. For graphical reasons, not all predicted causal arrows are drawn in. The hypotheses are described from the end to the beginning of

the causal chain.

Democratic legitimation is divided into democratic values (also sometimes called democratic ideals) and approval of the performance of the existing democratic regime (also sometimes called democratic practice or reality). The literature on political support broadly agrees on a distinction between political confidence and democratic legitimation (e.g., Lehman 1986; cf. Easton 1965, 1975, on specific and diffuse support). The literature also distinguishes between democratic ideals and democratic reality, but there is no systematic agreement about which of these concepts should be causally prior to the other. In my own past research, I have treated ideals as the best ultimate indicator of democratic legitimation because approval of democratic performance was closer to partisan judgments of performance. However, more recent literature has taken approval of democratic performance as the best ultimate indicator because ideals are seen as merely abstract lip-service (e.g., Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson 1995; Shin 1995). I think both arguments have merit. As a practical matter, I have modeled approval of democratic performance as the ultimate dependent variable in Figure 3 because it is more liable to temporal variation than ideals. In either case, democratic ideals should be positively related to democratic reality in a well-legitimated regime.

According to Westle's (1994) arguments (cf. Fuchs 1996, 1997), socialist values should be positively related to democratic ideals for East Germans because they were socialized under the theory of socialist democracy. Empirical support for this proposition is still mixed. The few existing surveys (among young people only) from the German Democratic Republic show a drastic fall-off in socialist values after the mid-1980s (Friedrich 1990). It is likely that many East Germans still believed that socialism and democracy were compatible prior to the 1980s, but this belief was severely shaken for many of them who lived through the failure of socialism. [Add cites to more recent literature.] Thus, it is uncertain whether socialist values will correlate positively, if at all, with democratic ideals - and if so, whether this correlation will be stronger in eastern Germany than western Germany. I consider it much more likely that socialist values will be negatively related to approval of the existing democracy. As we will see, technical problems in data analysis (multicollinearity) hindered all but a preliminary test of these hypotheses, so they had to be dropped from the model in the main analyses.

The central hypotheses of this study follow straightforwardly from the discussion in previous sections. Those who found western democracies attractive (and/or followed western media) are more likely to hold democratic ideals and approve of existing democracy. Those who feel no nostalgia for the old regime, or feel that the present regime is better, are likely to feel the same way. Economic difficulties are not likely to undermine democratic legitimation once other factors are taken into account. While the

present regime may experience severe difficulties, the hypotheses suggest that citizens will give the new democratic regime the benefit of the doubt for some indeterminate period of time (a "honeymoon period"), if only because they see no viable alternative. However, as several investigators have found, state or government performance is likely to affect approval of existing democracy, but perhaps not democratic ideals (Fuchs and Roller 1994; Roller, Wessels, Fuchs, and Klingemann 1994; Shin 1995).

Age and education are entered into the elaborated model as controls because much research has indicated their importance in value socialization. Most other social structural variables - e.g., sex, income class, unemployment, and church attendance - have only occasionally been shown to affect democratic attitudes, and my own preliminary analyses suggested that most of their influence is washed out once the main variables are considered. For these reasons, age and education are the only social structural variables included in the present models.

Partisanship should be related to democratic legitimation in rather specific ways. Supporters of parties in government may approve of the performance of the existing democracy more, and supporters of the opposition may approve less. All supporters of established mainstream parties should support democratic ideals, but this may produce no measurable correlation because they may not differ much from each other and because they constitute such a large percentage of the sample. By contrast, supporters of extremist parties (the far-right Republikaner and the post-communist PDS) are likely to disapprove of existing democracy. The far-right Republikaner will probably oppose democratic ideals, but those on the far left might or might not support them - just as socialist values might or might not correlate with democratic ideals. The far left has a history of supporting democracy in the abstract but opposing "bourgeois" democracy in practice.

## **SAMPLE AND QUESTIONNAIRE**

A survey was conducted in eastern and western Germany in December 1992 that measures the elements in the elaborated model in Figure 3. The Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach carried out 1081 Face-to-face interviews in western Germany, and 1131 interviews in eastern Germany, to create representative samples of the population over age 16 in each region. This survey is a partial replication and expansion of a previous survey, conducted in September 1991 as part of the same

research project.<sup>6</sup>

Many of the questions on the survey are replications or adaptations of questions used and tested in comparable situations. Most questions come from West German surveys, some come from American or other European surveys, and a few were tested earlier on eastern German surveys. The questionnaire was initially constructed from a very large data base (ca. 15,000 data points) of questions assembled in research on democratic attitudes (see Weil 1989 for a fuller description of the data base). A number of scales have been suggested in the literature, but as we will, see, renewed validation tests were conducted for the present paper. Prior to the 1991 survey, a preliminary questionnaire was circulated among scholars in the field to elicit suggestions for improvement. The instrument was then refined in conference with the Allensbach's questionnaire-development staff. A pretest was conducted using an enlarged version of the questionnaire, exploratory tests were conducted as preliminary validation of the indicators, and the questionnaire was further refined. Appendix B shows the survey questions used to construct variables for the analyses.

## **METHODS AND VALIDATION**

I used Structural equations models (SEMs) to empirically test the theoretical models discussed earlier. Structural equations models are appropriate because they permit construction of latent variables (scales from multiple indicators) and, simultaneously, evaluation of causal models. I followed a procedure in several steps:

First, I created and validated scales for the dependent variables. Studies of legitimation have traditionally distinguished between narrow and diffuse support, sometimes between trust of incumbents and philosophical support for democracy. More recent work, much of it on Germany and new European democracies, tends to distinguish at least three levels: evaluation of the performance of the administration (government performance), evaluation of the performance of the democratic regime (democratic performance or democratic reality), and support for the ideals of democracy (democratic values or ideals). Since much of this research concerns transitions from socialist regimes, parallel measures are posited with respect to

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<sup>6</sup>The 1992 survey was partially funded by a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation to Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and the author, and the 1991 survey was partially funded by grant number SES-9023331 from the National Science Foundation to the author. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann generously made additional portions of these surveys available to me for analysis.

socialism; and much of the debate has centered on the relationship of the four variables: democratic ideals and reality, and socialist ideals and reality. I took democratic performance and democratic values as the ultimate dependent variables for the present study, and reserved government performance as an independent variable. I wanted to treat socialist values (ideals) as the last independent variable in the causal chain, and nostalgia for the old regime as a prior independent variable. The latter two variables are sufficiently close to socialist ideals and reality, that my first step of analysis was to refine scales for these four variables: democratic performance, democratic values, socialist values, and nostalgia (socialist performance). I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (a type of structural equations model) to this end. Scholars have debated whether democratic performance or democratic values should be the ultimate dependent variable. Current usage leans toward democratic performance, and for that reason, and because it probably varies more than ideals do, I have taken democratic performance as the ultimate dependent variable here. These analyses constitute an internal validation of the dependent variables.

Second, I conducted an external validation of the democracy scales. The opinion survey included a question that asks what characteristics define democracy, and presents a long list of possible elements. I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of these democratic definitions, and then evaluated a causal structural equations model that tests which definitions most affect the democracy scales. In effect, this shows how respondents understand the democracy scales. I wanted to conduct the same analysis on both the democracy and the socialism scales, but as we will see, problems of multicollinearity caused the statistical models to break down, and I was forced to exclude one of the four variables from further analysis. Because the democracy scales and nostalgia were most central to my own model, I dropped socialist values from the further SEMs.

Third, I tested the central theoretical models. I used the validated democracy scales as the dependent variables, and created and refined scales (latent variables) for the main independent variables in the model: admiration for foreign democracies (diffusion), lack of nostalgia for the former regime, government performance, and economic performance. As a second step, I included several further independent variables in the models: education, age, sympathy for left and right extreme parties (the PDS and Republikaner), and sympathy for left and right moderate parties (the SPD and CDU-CSU). These were also structural equations models that simultaneously tested scale dimensionality (the latent variables) and the causal structure of the model.

Part of my objective in all three of these stages of analysis was to statistically test whether eastern and western Germany were the same or differed. Thus, in each stage, I conducted exploratory analysis on each region separately, then pooled the

data and explicitly tested whether model parameters differed statistically, or whether they could be constrained to be equal. In other words, I tested whether the same scales could be constructed for each region - and necessarily refined my scales to make them both reasonable and comparable - and whether the causal structure was the same for each region. When an independent variable affects a dependent variable differently in the two regions, this constitutes an interaction effect. (See Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998 for a discussion of multigroup SEMs.)

Having explored the dimensions and causes of democratic legitimation in the two regions of Germany, I wanted to see where it was stronger, everything else being equal. That is, given certain levels of diffusion, nostalgia, and perceptions of performance (holding them constant in the two regions), is democratic legitimation higher in eastern or western Germany? Unfortunately, the structural equations models proved inadequate to this task. The SEMs broke down for technical reasons that can be summarized in the following non-technical fashion.<sup>7</sup> In order to compare means of dependent latent variables (legitimacy) in two groups, one must follow several steps. First, one must show that the same scales can be constructed for both groups, and that the causal structure is the same, or nearly so, in both groups. These are the steps I described in the preceding paragraphs. Next, one must show that the means of sufficient observed independent variables can be set equal, and that the means of the latent independent variables can be set equal. If so, one can test whether and/or how the means of the dependent latent variables differ. The SEMs handle this task well if things are the same between groups, or if they differ slightly. However, if the independent-variable means are quite different, as they are here, the models break down (estimation iterations do not converge on a solution), and a valid model cannot be computed. Since the SEMs could not be used, I turned to ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression models for the last stage of analysis. The SEMs showed what causal structure to use - which scales were validated, which variables could be included, which interaction effects were present. I simply pooled the data for the two regions, replicated the causal model, and included region as a dummy variable (including in interaction effects, where appropriate).

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<sup>7</sup>Comparison of means across groups with structural equations models is evidently at the frontier of current development of the method. I consulted the literature on this issue, and when I reached a dead end, I wrote some of the leading authors and posted a query on "SEMnet," the internet discussion group for SEM developers. The best advice I received was that there is no consensus at present on how to solve my problem; but the experts agreed that the procedure I followed was justifiable in the present case.

## ANALYSES

### Internal Validation and dimensionality of the Legitimation Scales

As described above, I computed confirmatory factor analysis SEMs of support for democracy and socialism. This entailed the testing and refinement of multiple-indicator scales, and the exclusion of some indicators that produced different results in the two regions. The goal here was not to insist that certain pre-defined scales be used in both regions, but rather, beginning with such scales, to refine them so that they had the same content and measured the same thing in both regions. That is, I wanted to develop usable scales to measure my theoretical concepts. In a few cases, it was possible to include more indicators in models at earlier stages of the analysis, but certain indicators caused later, more complex models to be unstable, and had to be culled out. I developed scales for four variables: democratic values (ideals), democratic performance (practice, reality), socialist values (ideals), and nostalgia for the old GDR regime (socialist performance, practice, reality) (see Appendix B).

For democratic values, I wanted to include questions about whether one man should rule, whether Nazism was so bad, and several items from the Wildenmann/Kaase democracy scale. While I could build scales from these items that held together in each region alone, I could not constrain them to hold together in both regions in the identical fashion. In the end, I used three items from the Wildenmann/Kaase scale: democratic parties' right, in principle, to enter government, citizens' right to protest, and the right to hold a dissenting opinion. For democratic performance, I was able to build a scale out of the two indicators I wanted to use: whether the democratic regime in Germany is the best one, and whether democracy can solve the country's problems. A commonly-used indicator for democratic performance, how well democracy is functioning in our country, was not available on my survey.

For socialist values, I wanted to use three indicators, whether socialism (or communism) was a good idea badly carried out, whether a third way is possible between socialism and a social market economy, and preference for equality over freedom. The first two indicators could be combined in a scale, but the third behaved differently in the two regions and was excluded. Finally, for nostalgia, I wanted to use four indicators: whether German unification was more occasion for concern than joy, whether conditions in the old GDR were really bearable, whether one would like to turn back the wheel of history, and a better evaluation of conditions before the transition than at the time of the survey (evaluations were asked of each separately, and a scale was computed). Three of these four items, excluding the wheel of history, could be used.

With the scales thus refined, several findings emerged (see Figures 4a and 4b<sup>8</sup>). First, I confirmed that the scales operated the same way in both regions: five of the six factor loadings could be constrained to be identical between regions.<sup>9</sup> Second, nostalgia had almost no effect on democratic values in either region at this stage of the analysis. Third, socialist values and democratic values were positively (moderately) related, equally in both regions; and democratic values were related positively (rather weakly) to democratic performance, equally in both regions. These findings are important because they contradict the idea that socialist-democratic ideals exist only in the east, not in the west. If the linkage exists - and here it is moderate and positive - it is the same in both regions. The findings also show that westerners do not link democratic values to democratic performance more strongly than easterners: both do so equally, but not very strongly in this test. The remaining three links are much stronger in the east than in the west. For easterners, nostalgia (socialist performance) is very strongly related to socialist values - but only weakly in the west. And support for socialism (ideals and practice, i.e., values and nostalgia) drives down approval of democratic performance much more in the east than in the west. These regional differences support the often-made proposition that - much more than westerners - the more easterners liked socialism, the more they support the idea of democracy, but are unhappy with democratic performance. The most surprising finding is that the socialist-democratic-ideals linkage is not stronger in the east than in the west.

### **External Validation of the Legitimation Scales**

In the next step of analysis, I investigated what the respondents understood the democracy scales to mean. I did this with the help of a question about which things have to be true in order to call a country democratic. I proceeded in two stages. First, I analyzed what dimensions of democracy respondents perceived, and second, I analyzed which of these dimensions were related to the democratic legitimation

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<sup>8</sup>Figures 4a and 4b show standardized coefficients. It is not correct to make comparisons between regions on the basis of standardized coefficients, but I find them more intuitive to view. The results I report in the text are based on unstandardized coefficients, which are the correct ones to compare.

<sup>9</sup>For this sort of test, one indicator per latent variable (scale) is set to unity (1), as an index. The rest are allowed to vary, except that they are constrained to be equal between the two regions, one by one, in nested models, and the statistical significance is evaluated for each constraint. If at least one indicator (besides the index) per latent variable can be constrained equal between regions, then the factor structure can be considered equivalent: that is, the scales are comparable in both regions.

variables.

For many years, the Allensbach Institut has asked which items on a list are part of the definition of democracy. The list was designed to tap three primary dimensions of democracy: western-style representative democracy, participatory democracy, and economic democracy. Traditionally, most analysts (including me) have grouped the items into these categories. Most writers have not actually analyzed or tried to confirm this dimensionality, but my own exploratory analyses have long suggested that it is true. I conducted exploratory factor analysis on this question from the 1992 survey, and it seemed to produce this dimensional structure in both eastern and western Germany. The more rigorous confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) also pointed to the same three dimensions, but the loadings of some of the items differed too greatly between regions to be used in common scales. Again, I refined the scales to include only identical items for both regions. There was no evidence that these three dimensions were incorrect, only that some items loaded more strongly in one region than the other, and should be excluded to produce a scale that could be used in both regions. The items are listed in Appendix B. The CFA results (not shown) indicate that the representative and the economic definitions are unrelated (zero) in both regions, and that participatory and economic definitions are strongly, positively related, equally in both regions. The representative and participatory definitions are moderately, positively related, but slightly more strongly in the east than in the west. (In the causal model, discussed next, this correlation becomes equal in the two regions.)

Figures 5a and 5b show causal SEMs that estimate how respondents interpret the democratic legitimization scales. The results show that easterners and westerners understand democratic legitimization in very similar ways. Respondents in both regions understood democratic values mainly in terms of participatory democracy, and to a lesser extent in terms of representative democracy. (The representative component is somewhat stronger in the west, but the difference is just on the margin of statistical significance.) They understood democratic values as the opposite of economic democracy in the west, and as virtually unrelated to economic democracy in the east. There were no regional differences in how respondents understood the democratic performance scale: they understood it strongly as a measure of representative democracy, as the opposite of participatory democracy (a moderate correlation), and hardly in terms of economic democracy at all (a very slightly negative correlation). Thus, if we want a measure of support for western-style representative democracy, then the democratic performance scale is better, and we have some justification for treating it as the ultimate dependent variable in the following models. Altogether, these models provide good external validation of the democratic legitimization variables.

### **Causal Analysis**

We now come to empirical tests of the main theoretical models. I proceed in three steps. First, I describe the new scales (latent variables) that are introduced in this section. Second, I describe two SEM analyses of the factors that influence democratic legitimation - one simpler and one more complex. Third, I describe OLS regression models that show where democratic legitimation is higher, net of the other factors in the model.

I developed scales to measure causal factors in the same way I developed scales to measure democratic legitimation. I began with survey questions that appeared to be good indicators, conducted exploratory factor analysis separately in each region, to see if the items were related, and then refined the scales in the causal SEMs so that both regions contained the same scale construction. That is, I was guided by theory, but refined the latent variables (scales) so that they were comparable between regions. The new scales in the basic causal model measure diffusion, government performance, and economic performance. In the second, more complex model, scales are developed of sympathy for the extreme-left PDS and the extreme-right Republikaner. (See Appendix B for question texts discussed in this section.)

Diffusion of democracy is measured by a question that asks whether the respondent admires the political system of various countries. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses indicated that three clusters of countries could be isolated: large, powerful western countries with long traditions of democracy (the U.S., Britain, and France); small, affluent democracies that were generally non-aligned in the cold war (Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria); and former Soviet-bloc countries (Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland). For the present analyses, the first cluster of western democracies was used.<sup>10</sup> The survey also asked easterners whether they had watched western television prior to the transition. This variable was used in exploratory analyses, and I mention some results in the discussion section. However, the question was obviously not asked in the west, and therefore is not included in the SEMs.

Government performance is meant to measure a form of system support below support for democracy, but above support for the government's specific policies (Fuchs and Roller 1998). The government performance scale is composed of the following items: agreement with the CDU/CSU and the FDP (the governing coalition parties),

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<sup>10</sup>In a revision, it might make sense to add the second cluster, the small, rich, neutral democracies. Preliminary analyses indicate that admiration of these countries is strongly related to democratic ideals, socialist ideals, and negatively to democratic performance. Thus, respondents might see them as a model of a social-democratic third way.

impression that the government can handle its tasks, trust in the government in Bonn, and a good impression of the Bundesrat (the upper house of Parliament). This scale removes partisanship to a certain extent because at the time of the survey, the lower house of parliament was controlled by the center-right CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, and the upper house was controlled by the center-left SPD.

The economic performance scale is composed of three elements: evaluations of personal and national economic well-being, and economic items from a list of worries that formed a cluster in exploratory factor analysis (unemployment, economic cutbacks, and a housing shortage). Despite distinctions in the literature between personal (egocentric) and national (sociotropic) economic evaluations, exploratory analyses suggested that these economic indicators worked in parallel in causal models; and the SEM analyses show that they can be combined into a single scale. Whatever distinctions may be lost here, this approach at least has the virtue of simplicity.

Finally, the scales of sympathy for extremist parties are composed of three parallel items, each, for the far-left and far-right parties: a preference ranking, approval of cooperation with the party, and approval of party growth.

Diagrams of the simpler and more complex causal SEMs are shown in Figures 6 and 7. Tables 1 and 2 show the parameter values for the fitted models for the two legitimization variables, democratic values and democratic performance. The overall models provide acceptable fits to the data. (For the simpler model, RMSEA=.027 with  $p=1.000$ , IFI=.938, TLI=.929, and AGFI=.955. For the more complex model, RMSEA=.028 with  $p=1.000$ , IFI=.924, TLI=.911, and AGFI=.932.) More importantly, nested models tested the individual statistical significance of each path in the models - and its possible equality between regions. (These tests were very extensive and, while the individual stages of analysis are not shown here, the results are reflected in the parameters in Tables 1 and 2.)

Several global results are immediately apparent. First, the causal structure of legitimization is nearly identical in eastern and western Germany, with only two exceptions, to be noted below. Second, the addition of control variables in the more complex model almost never weakens the central causal variables from the simpler model. Therefore, I will focus on the results of the more complex models. Third, the models do not account for much of the variance for democratic values (Table 1), but they do for democratic performance (Table 2). Moreover, the models explain more of the variance for democratic values in the west, and more for democratic performance in the east. Fourth, the only variables that never have an effect on legitimization are economic performance and the respondent's age.

The central hypotheses of the study receive strong, but not universal, support. Admiration for western democracies (diffusion) always increases democratic legitimation, as measured by both indicators. Nostalgia for the old GDR regime lowers evaluations of democratic performance, but not democratic values. And the addition of control variables in the more complex models reduces nostalgia's effect on democratic performance (though it remains substantial), but it does not reduce diffusion's effects. Thus, net of all control variables, diffusion and nostalgia affect democratic legitimation. Diffusion's effects are more consistent, while nostalgia only affects the ultimate, not the penultimate, measure of legitimation. Also, as expected, democratic values raise evaluations of democratic performance.

The influence of performance varies dramatically, depending on what is being measured, and where. Government performance is the strongest predictor of legitimation in all models, while economic performance never has an effect. Also, government performance's effect varies by region and by the type of legitimation. Government performance has a stronger effect on democratic performance than on democratic values; and it raises evaluations of democratic performance much more in the east than in the west. These findings are significant in several respects. First, they correspond to theories that array political support from the practical to the ideal. According to such theories, government performance should have more impact on evaluations of democratic practice than on democratic ideals because it is more proximate - and this is exactly what we find. The results show that "proximity" is important in a second way, too. Government performance is more proximate to legitimation than is economic performance (the latter is more exogenous) - and its impact is much greater in our tests. This is a good sign for democracy. It indicates that the more exogenous (the less proximate) performance is, the less democratic legitimation is dependent on it. And third, the results indicate that performance is more important in a newer democracy than in a more established one. Democratic legitimation is more dependent on government performance in the east than in the west. This finding is consistent with arguments that democratic legitimation requires the passage of time to deepen. All these considerations point in one direction. The more democratic legitimation is shielded from the jolts of poor exogenous performance, the more robust it is.

The control variables entered in the more complex model do not remove the effects of diffusion, nostalgia, and performance, although as noted, they do reduce nostalgia's effect somewhat. With one exception, the control variables only affect the democratic performance scale, not the democratic values scale. Thus, sympathy for extremist parties (both left and right) lowers evaluations of democratic performance; while sympathy for the center-left SPD raises legitimation. (Due to multicollinearity, it was not possible to include measures of support for other centrist parties, but

exploratory analyses suggested that they also increase legitimation.) This finding is consistent with much research. Support for pro-system parties contributes to democratic legitimation, but support for anti-system parties reduces legitimation. However, we can only speak of the legitimation of the existing system, not democratic ideals: party support - pro-system or anti-system - has no effect on the democratic values scale in these tests.

The effects of education are a little more complex. Higher education promotes both types of democratic legitimation in the west, but only democratic performance in the east. Basically, this result is consistent with most research, which shows that education increases democratic legitimation. Yet there are debates in the literature as to how universal education's effect is. I and others have long argued that education may not attain its legitimizing influence until some time after a transition, because the old regime tried to inculcate its own values through education, and the new regime has not yet shaped educational institutions. In this respect, an education effect reflects a more mature democratic political culture. These propositions fit the findings: education has a greater effect in the west, as befits a more mature democracy, and less in the east, as befits a newer, less established democracy.

The respondent's age never has an effect in these models. Age is coded in a linear fashion, from young to old, so it is not a good test of political generations or cohorts. My preliminary analysis of cohort data (not shown here) suggests that cohorts also do not have a strong effect in these data.<sup>11</sup>

The final models test whether democratic legitimation is higher in eastern or western Germany, net of the other factors we have examined. I used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models because the SEMs would not compute these results (see the Methods section, above). In order to make the OLS models comparable, I replicated the causal structure of the SEMs, and included region as a dummy variable, including interaction effects with region where appropriate. I computed scales from the same observed indicators, using factor scores from principle components analyses.

The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4. A glance at these tables shows, first, that legitimation does differ between regions, and second, that the OLS models are broadly consistent with the SEM results. Holding other factors constant, democratic values (ideals) are fairly similar between regions, and approval of democratic performance is much higher in the west. In the simpler model, there are no significant

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<sup>11</sup>I have compared the weak cohort effects in eastern Germany after 1989 to the strong cohort effects in western Germany after 1945 in another paper (Weil 1994).

regional differences in democratic values, but in the more complex model, there is an education-region interaction effect. This effect confirms what we saw earlier: education's effect on democratic values is stronger in the west. And westerners express much more approval of the existing democracy, net of other factors, than do easterners. Thus, the results confirm the common observation that easterners support democracy in principle, but question its implementation in the unified Federal Republic, more than westerners do.

The remaining OLS results are broadly consistent with the earlier SEM results. Diffusion, nostalgia, and performance mostly have the same effects on legitimation that we saw earlier, though with minor differences. Government performance's effect is still very strong, but it no longer stands out quite as much from the other factors. Diffusion's effects are a little more inconsistent this time, while nostalgia's effects are more consistent: in the SEM results, it was the other way around. Economic performance and age are statistically significant in one test each, but the effects are still not extremely strong. Sympathy for the far-right Republikaner is marginally pro-democratic in one test, and support for the center-left SPD is moderately anti-democratic in another. These party effects are anomalies that I want to investigate more thoroughly in a revision of this paper. Finally, the coefficients and the explained variance are somewhat weaker in the OLS models than in the SEMs. This is as it should be: structural equations models are designed to move more of the random variance into the error term, thus strengthening the substantive coefficients. Thus, the OLS results are broadly consistent with the SEM results. Where there are marginal differences, I consider the SEMs to be more reliable because they do a more thorough job of accounting for variance.

## DISCUSSION

In this paper, I proposed a base-line model of the causes of democratic legitimation, especially in a new democracy; and I tested part of it with data from post-communist eastern Germany, with comparisons to western Germany. The base-line model is grounded on two distinctions: first, whether the sources of legitimation are attributes of democracy itself or exogenous to democracy, and second, whether or not legitimation is based on citizens' direct experience with the regime's performance. These distinctions yielded a four-fold classification of causes of legitimation: the performance of democracy itself (especially the opposition structure), state and economic performance, foreign democracies as models to emulate (value diffusion or demonstration effects), and a residual category of preconditions for democracy (especially level of development or "nation-stateness"). Comparisons to the pre-democratic regime (nostalgia or historical preferences) was a possible fifth cause that cross-cut the two performance factors. It was not possible directly to test the effects of

opposition structure and democratic preconditions in a single cross-sectional case. Thus, an elaborated model was proposed for unified Germany that tested the remaining three factors, added some background controls, and (to a limited extent) included opinions about socialism as an alternative. This model was tested with national survey data from late 1992.

The resulting analyses broadly supported the hypotheses. First, citizens who admired western democracies tended to favor democracy. In other analyses from the same data (not shown) easterners who watched western TV prior to unification also expressed more support for democracy. These demonstration or diffusion effects held up rather well, even when other factors were taken into account. Second, citizens who were not nostalgic for the old regime and believed that the present regime is an improvement (historical preferences) were more likely to support democracy. Third, citizens who approved of government performance supported the existing democratic regime and adhered more strongly to democratic ideals. By contrast, approval of economic performance was entirely unrelated to support for democracy, except in one small instance that was contradicted by more reliable tests.

Along the way, in the course of validation analysis, it was possible to address an additional proposition from the literature. Some researchers have suggested that socialist values may themselves be an important source of democratic values in eastern Germany - though perhaps of a different kind: socialist democracy rather than the liberal democracy of the west. Evidence for this proposition in the present analyses is mixed. (These analyses can only be considered provisional, because as validation, they include almost no controls for other factors.) Socialist values are indeed linked to democratic values, but this connection is the same in both regions, not stronger in the east. However, approval for socialist values and socialist performance (nostalgia) drives down approval of the present democratic regime more strongly in the east than in the west. This linkage is not at the core of the thesis, but it is still relevant. Other validation analyses provide somewhat less support for the thesis. Both easterners and westerners saw economic democracy as the opposite of both democratic values and democratic performance: this linkage was stronger in the west, but it was still strong in the east. Possibly more favorably to the thesis, easterners and westerners defined democratic values in terms of participation, but defined democratic performance as the opposite of participation - but easterners and westerners did not differ in these respects. Thus, evidence of eastern German socialist-democratic values is only mixed. The present analyses were not designed to address this thesis directly, and more extensive models would have to be tested. However, multicollinearity would be an obstacle to such analysis. Structural equations models broke down when I tried to include all four variables (democratic/socialist ideals/performance) beyond the validation stage. Perhaps another approach would be necessary here.

Finally, although I was not able to directly test the proposition with the present data that a well-functioning opposition structure promotes legitimation, the pattern of results indirectly supports the hypothesis. A well-established regime should be able to socialize its citizens in democratic values through the educational system. Better educated respondents in the west, but not in the east, supported democratic ideals more, as befits an older democracy. Western citizens also understood democracy more strongly in representative terms than did easterners, who in turn, understood democracy more strongly in participatory terms. Citizens of the newer democracy in the east made their support for the system more dependent on good government performance: for citizens of the older western democracy, system support was less dependent on this semi-exogenous factor. Finally, the multivariate models in the west explained slightly more of the variance for democratic values, while the eastern models explained much more variance for approval of democratic performance. In all these cases, the western results suggest a population whose support for democratic ideals are more structured or crystallized according to their longer experience with, and socialization in, democracy than are those in the east. By contrast, eastern legitimation appears to be based more on regime-exogenous performance and less on standard ideals and definitions of western democracy, as befits a population less familiar with the workings of a democratic regime. Taken as a whole, this pattern of results provides some indirect evidence that citizens' experience with a well-functioning democratic regime promotes democratic values: the longer their experience, the stronger and more structured their legitimation.

I do not argue in this paper that value diffusion and nostalgia should be preferred as an explanation for democratic legitimation to experience with a well-functioning democratic regime (opposition-structure performance). I think all three factors are important, and the present results support this view. While the effects of the opposition structure could not be directly tested here, indirect evidence consistently points to its influence. And while the diffusion and nostalgia hypotheses have sometimes been dismissed in the literature without being explicitly tested, the present analysis provides solid, direct evidence of their importance. Comparative and historical data would be needed to fully test the macro variables in this theoretical model - the present data simply provide a snapshot of two regions of the same country at a single point in time - but within this limitation, the results show good support.

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**Appendix A: Question Texts for Figure 1**

- A. SPAIN. Do you think it is better for one person to have all the authority and make all the decisions for us, or for a group of people elected by all the citizens to make the political decisions? (1966, 74, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82. Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, Madrid)
- B. FRANCE. Lastly, how many parties do you think there should be? [Two; Three or more; One; None] (1958, 67. Source: ICPSR 7278, 7372)
- C. WEST GERMANY, EAST GERMANY. Do you think it is better for a country to have one party, to obtain the greatest possible unity, or several parties so that the various opinions can be freely represented? Several parties, Not more than two or three parties, One party, No parties. (1950, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 67, 68, 72, 77, 78, 90. Source: Allensbach Institut)
- D. AUSTRIA. Now, aside from your opinion about what could happen in the future, what would you personally wish and what would you not wish? [...show on cards] 'That there will be only a single party in austria, a 'unity' party.' (Don't wish it ) (1976, 78, 79, 80. Source: IMAS)
- E. POLAND. Do you think that what we need now in Poland is: A strong and centralized authority with one party (PUWP) holding the monopoly of power; A strong and centralized authority, but not based on a single party monopoly; A decentrallized authority with single-party leadership; A decentralized authority, allowing various social forces to participate and no singe-party monopoly? (1981, 84 [Ns = 1888, 1903]. Source: Prof. Wladyslaw Adamski, Polish Academy of Sciences, personal communication)
- F. POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND HUNGARY. Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove of the change in [Country] to a multiparty system? (1991. Source: Times-Mirror)
- G. RUSSIA. Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove of efforts to establish a multiparty system in Russia? (1991. Source: Times-Mirror)

## Appendix B: Question Texts and Scale Construction

Note: This section is taken over unrevised from a much earlier draft of this paper. I think all the questions referred to in the text are given here, but there are additional questions, and they are not all organized as they now are in the text.

1. SOCIALIST VALUES (Eigenvalues = 1.29/1.34). (A) Do you consider Communism [half sample: Socialism] to be a good idea that was badly carried out? [Yes] (.74/.76). (B) Do you think that in the West there still can be a third way, that is a combination, between a planned economy and a social market economy, or don't you think so? [Think so] (.73/.63). (C) Here two people discuss which is more important finally, freedom or greatest possible equality. Which of the two is saying most closely what you also think? The top person: "I believe that freedom and the greatest possible equality are really both equally important. But if I had to choose, I would say that for me personal freedom is the most important, because then everyone can live in freedom and develop themselves unhindered." The bottom person: "Sure freedom and the greatest possible equality are both equally important. But if I had to choose, I would find the greatest possible equality most important, so that no one is disadvantaged and the social differences are not too great." [Equality] (.46/.61)
2. DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (Eigenvalues = 1.25/1.64). (A) Two men are discussing how a country should be governed. The one says: "I like it best when the people place the best politician at the top and gives him complete governing power. He can then clearly and quickly decide with a few chosen experts. Not much talking is done and something really happens!" The other says: "I prefer that a number of people have to determine something in the country. They do sometimes go round and round until something is done, but it is not so easy for abuse of power to occur." Which of these two opinions is closest to your own view - the first or the second? [Second] (.72/.67). (B) A question about Hitler and National Socialism: Some say, if you disregard the war and the persecution of the Jews, the Third Reich was not so bad. Others say, the Third Reich was a bad thing no matter what. What is your opinion? [Nazism a Bad Thing] (.67/.63). (C) On these cards, we have put together a series of commonly-heard opinions about peoples' behavior. We would like to find out what people really think. Please sort out the cards on this scale according to how much you agree or disagree with each statement. (.54/.58) [Agree; Factor (Eigenvalue = 1.92/1.62) including:] (a) A living democracy is inconceivable without a political opposition. (.71/.53); (b) Every democratic party should have the right in principle to enter government. (.65/.58); (c) Every citizen has the right to go to the streets for his convictions if necessary. (.64/.66); (d) Everyone should have the right to stand up for his opinion, even if the majority disagrees. (.68/.66).
3. APPROVE OF EXISTING DEMOCRACY (Eigenvalues = 1.22/1.28). (A) Do you believe that the democracy that we have in Germany is the best form of state or is there


- another form of state which is better? [Best Form of State] (.78/.80). (B) If someone says, "We can solve the problems we have in the Federal Republic with democracy," would you agree or not? [Agree] (.78/.80).
4. DEFINITIONS OF DEMOCRACY. "In your opinion, what is most important about democracy. Which things on this list are absolutely necessary for one to be able to say of a country, this is a democracy?" (A) BASIC DEFINITION. (Eigenvalue = 1.72/1.82, including:) (a) Freedom of the press and opinion, that everyone can freely express their political opinions. (.58/.68); (b) That one can choose from several parties to vote for. (.64/.67); (c) That free elections with secret ballots are held regularly. (.62/.69); (d) A strong opposition that keeps the government in check. (.46/.34); (e) That everyone can freely practice their religion. (.45/.58); (f) Independent courts that judge only according to the law. (.65/.39). (B) PARTICIPATORY DEFINITION. (Eigenvalue = 3.41/3.45, including:) (a) That citizens can decide about important issues in referenda. (.74/.65); (b) That the employees can participate in decision-making at their workplace. (.58/.63); (c) That citizens can participate in many government decisions. (.77/.71). (C) ECONOMIC DEFINITION. (Eigenvalue = .89/.97, including:) (a) That no one suffers from want. (.60/.76); (b) That income differences are not very great. (.43/.71); (c) That everyone can choose the profession they want. (.73/.77).
  5. FREEDOM AND RIGHTS, NOT LIVING STANDARD. What do you think will be more important for people's happiness in the future, freedom and secure rights or a high standard of living? [Freedom and Law]
  6. AGE is coded 16-17, 18-20, thereafter in 5-year intervals up to age 79, and 80 and older.
  7. EDUCATION is coded in 9 levels of certification that differ somewhat in western and eastern Germany.
  8. EXPERIENCE OR FEAR OF UNEMPLOYMENT (Simple count of positive responses). (A) Have you been unemployed in the last two years or in earlier times? (Western Germany). Are you unemployed at present? (Eastern Germany). (B) Are you afraid you could become/remain unemployed in the next half year? (C) Has anyone else in your household been unemployed in the last two years, or is anyone unemployed now? (D) Are you afraid anyone in your household could become/remain unemployed in the next half year?


9. INCOME. Income of the head of the household is coded in 11 levels in western Germany, and Household income is coded in 5 categories in eastern Germany.
10. CHURCH ATTENDANCE. [Every Sunday, Almost Every Sunday, Now and Then, Seldom, Never, Not Member of a Church]
11. PREFERENCE RANKING OF PARTIES. On these cards are the names of the parties that have political importance in the Federal Republic. Certainly, you don't like all these parties equally. Could you please sort these cards according to how much you like these parties? It goes like this: you put the party you like best on top. Under that, you put the one you like second best, and so on. And the last one is the party you like least. [Parties that are ranked: CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, The Greens/Bündnis 90, The Republikaner, PDS (former Communists: in eastern Germany only). Variable is rank number, coded so that high preference is scored high. Republikaner and PDS measured according to following variable.]
12. SYMPATHY FOR FORMER COMMUNISTS/REPUBLIKANER (right radicals) (Eigenvalues = 2.04/2.86; 3.13/2.73). [Note: Parallel questions asked about each; Eigenvalues and loadings given for "Communists West/East; Republikaner West/East," respectively]. (A) People disagree whether it is possible for the PDS/the Republikaner to work with the other parties. Do you think that in the long run, normal cooperation with the PDS/the Republikaner will be possible, or not? [Cooperation Possible] (.87/.77; .83/.82). (B) Are you in favor or against cooperation of the PDS/the Republikaner with other parties? [For Cooperation.] (.89/.84; .86/.82). (C) And if somebody said, "It wouldn't be so bad if the PDS/the Republikaner got more support," would you agree or don't you see it that way? [Welcome more support] (.69/.81; .74/.72). (D) If there were an election for the Bundestag next Sunday, which party would you vote for - could you tell me which party on this list that is? You only have to mention the appropriate number. [PDS/the Republikaner] (.09/.55; .66/.55). (E) On these cards are listed the names of the parties that have political importance in the Federal Republic. I'm sure you don't like all these parties equally. Could you please lay out these cards in the order in which you like the parties? It works like this: you put the card of the party you like best on top. Next you put your second favorite party, and so on, and you put the party you like least on the bottom. [Rank of PDS/the Republikaner; PDS choice not given in West] (--/.62; .85/.75)
13. FORMERLY A MEMBER OF THE SED
14. LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT. Parties are sometimes divided up according to whether they are left, in the middle, or right. I have a paper here that has a ruler drawn on it. How would you describe your own political position, where on this ruler would you place yourself? [100-point scale]

15. ADMIRE WESTERN COUNTRIES (Eigenvalues = 1.13/1.08). (A) A very general question about German foreign policy: How important will it be for us in the future to work closely with America, that is, the USA? [Very Important or Important] (.75/.73). (B) Different countries have different forms of government and follow their own political paths. If you think about the countries on this list, which of them are admirable countries for you. For which of these countries do you especially like the political life? (.75/.73) [Factor (Eigenvalue = 2.65/1.41) including: USA (.75/.74), England (.74/.73), France (.72/.54)]
16. WATCHED WESTERN TV. (East Only) Prior to the unification of Germany, which television programs did you mostly watch: Programs from the West, DDR programs, or both about equally? [Western programs]
17. ADMIRE OTHER COUNTRIES. Different countries have different forms of government and follow their own political paths. If you think about the countries on this list, which of them are admirable countries for you. For which of these countries do you especially like the political life? (A) Sweden, Switzerland, Austria. (B) Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland
18. NOT NOSTALGIC FOR OLD GDR REGIME (Eigenvalues = 1.23/1.36). (A) Is the German reunification more an occasion for joy or concern for you? [Joy] (.70/.76). (B) When you look back to the last years in the DDR [In western Germany: for the people there] - were conditions really quite bearable or would you say that there absolutely had to be a change? [Absolutely had to change] (.68/.75). (C) Sometimes one wishes that he could turn back the Wheel of History. How do you feel: Have you ever thought that it would have been better if the two Germanies had not reunited, that it would have been better to have kept the original DDR, or have you never thought about that? [Would not be in favor of returning to before reunification] (.53/.46)
19. NO WALL IN THE HEAD: E/W GERMANS CAN TALK. You hear sometimes that Germans in East and West since the fall of the Wall treat each other like they are divided by a wall in their heads. How has it been with you? How have you experienced conversations with people from the eastern (western) part of Germany? Have you understood each other well, or have you not understood each other so well? [Understood well]
20. E/W GERMANS HAVE SAME NATIONAL CHARACTER. And do you think that eastern and western Germans have a common national character, or don't you believe that? [Common character]

21. EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL SITUATION NOW AS AGAINST THE PAST. If you think back to the time when Germany was still divided, what do you generally think of the situation at that time? Tell me according to this ladder: Zero would mean that the situation in our part of Germany was very bad, and 10 would mean that the situation here was very good. Which number best expresses what the situation here was like back then? What is the situation like at the present time? Which number best expresses the present situation in our part of Germany? [Present rating minus Past rating]
22. OUTLOOK FOR FUTURE SITUATION. If you look into the future, how will our part the country develop; how good or bad will the situation here be? Tell me again according to this ladder. [0-10 ladder]
23. HOPE, NOT FEAR, NEXT 12 MONTHS. A question about the next twelve months: Do you look forward to the next twelve months with hope or with fear? [Hope]
24. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE (Eigenvalues = 2.84/2.78). (A) Here is a picture of a thermometer. Could you show me on it how much you agree with the CDU/CSU? It goes like this: 100 means you agree completely, and zero means you don't agree at all. Where would you put the CDU/CSU? (.86/.86). (B) ...Where would you put the FDP? (.57/.60). (C) Back to politics. When you think about the tasks that the administration on Bonn has to handle, do you think that the CDU/CSU/FDP administration can handle these tasks, or would you prefer it if there was a change of administration as soon as possible? (.82/.76). (D) How much of the time can the administration be trusted to do the right thing? Would you say, almost always, most of the time, only sometimes, almost never? (.79/.79). (E) Something else. Do you have a good or a bad impression of the work of the Bundesrat in Bonn? (.69/.69)
25. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Eigenvalues = 1.55/1.56). (A) Generally speaking, what do you think of the present economic situation in Germany? [Very Good, Good, So-so, Bad, Very Bad] (.71/.38). (B) And what do you think of your own present economic situation? [Very Good or Good] (.80/.67). (C) We're trying to find out what people worry about. Could you please lay out these cards on this strip according to the way you feel about them. When you can't decide about a card, simply lay it on the side. [I'm very worried about it at the moment; I worry about it quite often; I sometimes worry about it; I'm not at all worried about it] (.62/.62) [Factor (Eigenvalue = 1.34/1.27) including:] (a) Unemployment (.74/.71); (b) That my economic situation will get worse, that I'll have to cut back on everything (.70/.73); (c) That the housing shortage will keep getting worse (.69/.57)


## Favor a Multiparty System/More than One Ruler





**Figure 2. Types of Causes of Democratic Legitimation:  
A Base-Line Model**

**Figure 3: An Elaborated Model of the Development of Democratic Values in Post-Communist Eastern Germany\***



\*Some factors from the Base-Line Model not shown because they do not vary in a single case at a single time-point. Not all causal arrows drawn in for graphical reasons.

**Democratic Attitudes in East and West Germany, December 1992**  
**Coefficients from Structural Equations Models**

**Table 1. Effects on Democratic Values.**

	Democratic Values												East-West can be Constrained Equal
	West						East						
	Unstand.	T	Stand.	Unstand.	T	Stand.	Unstand.	T	Stand.	Unstand.	T	Stand.	
<b>Admire Western Countries</b>	.14	2.80	.13	.11	2.31	.10	.14	2.80	.09	.11	2.31	.08	yes
Nostalgic	.00	-	.00	-.01	-1.01	-.03	.00	-	.00	-.01	-1.01	-.06	yes
<b>Government Performance</b>	-.08	-5.55	-.20	-.09	-5.17	-.24	-.08	-5.55	-.23	-.09	-5.17	-.26	yes
Economic Performance	.00	-	.00	.00	-	.00	.00	-	.00	.00	-	.00	yes
<b>Education</b>				.03	4.06	.18				.00	-.93	-.04	no
Age				.00	-	.00				.00	-	.00	yes
Sympathy for SPD				.00	-	.00				.00	-	.00	yes
Sympathy for Reps				.00	-	.00				.00	-	.00	yes
Sympathy for PDS				.00	-	.00				.00	-	.00	yes
Squ. Multiple Correlations	.05			.10			.05			.05			

**Table 2. Effects on Democratic Performance.**

	Democratic Performance												East-West can be Constrained Equal
	West						East						
	Unstand.	T	Stand.	Unstand.	T	Stand.	Unstand.	T	Stand.	Unstand.	T	Stand.	
<b>Democratic Values</b>	.24	3.96	.23	.25	4.27	.25	.24	3.96	.14	.25	4.27	.15	yes
<b>Admire Western Countries</b>	.20	3.04	.17	.18	2.92	.16	.20	3.04	.09	.18	2.92	.08	yes
<b>Nostalgic</b>	-.06	-5.25	-.23	-.03	-2.94	-.13	-.06	-5.25	-.29	-.03	-2.94	-.17	yes
<b>Government Performance</b>	.13	5.44	.32	.17	6.66	.42	.32	9.08	.54	.36	9.71	.61	no
Economic Performance	.00	-	.00	.00	-	.00	.00	-	.00	.00	-	.00	yes
<b>Education<sup>a</sup></b>				.01	2.48	.08				.01	2.48	.08	yes
Age				.00	-	.00				.00	-	.00	yes
<b>Sympathy for SPD</b>				.06	5.02	.21				.06	5.02	.15	yes
<b>Sympathy for Reps</b>				-.08	-3.76	-.16				-.08	-3.76	-.10	yes
<b>Sympathy for PDS</b>				-.08	-3.76	-.15				-.08	-3.76	-.13	yes
Squ. Multiple Correlations	.31			.42			.58			.64			

a. Education's effect is significantly equal between West and East, but it is significantly close to zero.

(Hypothesis that the effect = 0 in nested models has chi-square 6.087, 1df, p = 0.014, with sample size = ca. 2200)


**Democratic Attitudes in East and West Germany, December 1992**  
Coefficients from OLS Regression Models

**Table 3. Democratic Values factor Dependent**

Model	Unstandardized B	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized B	Standardized Beta
(Constant)	.03 (.03)		-.17 (.10)	+
<b>Admire Western Countries factor</b>	<b>.05 (.02)</b>	<b>.05 *</b>	.03 (.02)	.03
<b>Nostalgia factor</b>	<b>-.05 (.03)</b>	<b>-.05 *</b>	<b>-.06 (.03)</b>	<b>-.06 *</b>
<b>Government Performance factor</b>	<b>-.15 (.02)</b>	<b>-.15 **</b>	<b>-.14 (.03)</b>	<b>-.14 **</b>
Economic Performance factor	.01 (.02)	.01	.00 (.02)	.00
<b>Education Level</b>			<b>.08 (.02)</b>	<b>.16 **</b>
AGE			-.01 (.01)	-.02
Sympathy Towards SPD Party			.00 (.02)	.00
<b>REP Sympathy Factor</b>			<b>.04 (.02)</b>	<b>.05 +</b>
PDS Sympathy Factor			.03 (.02)	.03
<b>Region Dummy (E=1)</b>	<b>-.06 (.05)</b>	<b>-.03</b>	<b>.21 (.10)</b>	<b>.11 *</b>
<b>Education * Region Interaction (E=1)</b>			<b>-.08 (.02)</b>	<b>-.21 **</b>
Adjusted R-Sq	.02		.03	

**Table 4. Democratic Performance factor Dependent**

Model	Unstandardized B	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized B	Standardized Beta
(Constant)	.39 (.03)	**	.40 (.07)	**
<b>Democratic Values factor</b>	<b>.08 (.02)</b>	<b>.08 **</b>	<b>.08 (.02)</b>	<b>.08 **</b>
<b>Admire Western Countries factor</b>	<b>.07 (.02)</b>	<b>.07 **</b>	<b>.07 (.02)</b>	<b>.07 **</b>
<b>Nostalgia factor</b>	<b>-.14 (.02)</b>	<b>-.14 **</b>	<b>-.11 (.02)</b>	<b>-.11 **</b>
<b>Government Performance factor</b>	<b>.13 (.03)</b>	<b>.13 **</b>	<b>.14 (.03)</b>	<b>.14 **</b>
<b>Economic Performance factor</b>	<b>.05 (.02)</b>	<b>.05 **</b>	.03 (.02)	.03
Education Level			.01 (.01)	.02
AGE			.01 (.01)	.04 *
Sympathy Towards SPD Party			-.08 (.02)	-.08 **
REP Sympathy Factor			-.09 (.02)	-.09 **
PDS Sympathy Factor			-.10 (.02)	-.10 **
<b>Region Dummy (E=1)</b>	<b>-.75 (.04)</b>	<b>-.37 **</b>	<b>-.70 (.04)</b>	<b>-.36 **</b>
<b>Govt Perf * Region Interaction (E=1)</b>	<b>.23 (.04)</b>	<b>.16 **</b>	<b>.23 (.04)</b>	<b>.16 **</b>
Adjusted R-Sq	.28		.31	




**Figure 4a**

Dimensionality of  
 Socialist and Democratic Values  
 Comparing West & East Germany: West  
 Standardized estimates

RMSEA = .023, p = 1.000  
 IFI = .958; TLI = .941; AGFI = .978






**Figure 5a**

Validation Model:  
 Democratic Definitions & Values  
 Comparing West & East Germany: West  
 Standardized estimates


RMSEA = .025, p = 1.000  
 IFI = .947; TLI = .933; AGFI = .971



**Figure 5b**


Validation Model:  
 Democratic Definitions & Values  
 Comparing West & East Germany: East  
 Standardized estimates

RMSEA = .025, p = 1.000  
 IFI = .947; TLI = .933; AGFI = .971



Structural Equation/Causal Model  
 Comparing West & East:  
 Democratic Values in West Germany  
 Model Specification

Figure 6



Structural Equation/Causal Model  
 Comparing West & East:  
 Democratic Values in West Germany  
 Model Specification

**Figure 7**